Selections of St. Thomas Aquinas’ writings on the Jews

De Regimine Judaeorum (On the Government of the Jews)

To Margaret, Countess of Flanders or to Marguerite, Duchess of Brabant

To the illustrious Lady etc., Brother Thomas from Aquino of the Order of the Preachers sends his greeting, etc.

I received Your Excellency’s letters from which I have fully come to understand the pious care that you have concerning the rule of your subjects and the devout love you have towards the brethren of our Order, giving thanks to God who has breathed into your heart the seeds of such virtues. Nonetheless, what you asked of me in these self-same letters (that I should respond to you about certain items) was indeed difficult for me both because of my occupations, which the office of teaching requires, and because it would please me that on these things you would seek the counsel of others more expert in such matters. Still, because I considered it unbecoming that I be found out to be a negligent helper for your solicitude or that I be ungrateful of your love, I have taken care to respond to you about these proposed items without the prejudice of a better opinion.

First Response

First therefore, Your Excellency inquired whether it is allowable for you at some time and in what way to make an exaction upon the Jews.

To which question (proposed in this unqualified way) it can be answered that although, as the laws say, the Jews by reason of their fault are sentenced to perpetual servitude and thus the lords of the lands in which they dwell may take things from them as though they were their own—with, nonetheless, this restraint observed that the necessary subsidies of life in no way be taken from them, because it still is necessary that we “walk honestly even in the presence of those who are outsiders (I Thes. 4:11),” “lest the name of the Lord be blasphemed (I Tim. 6:1),” and the Apostle admonishes the faithful by his example that (I Cor. 10:32-33), “they be without offense in the presence of the Jews and the Gentiles and in the Church of God”—this seems to be what should be observed, that, as the laws have determined, the services coerced from them do not demand things that they had not been accustomed to do in times gone by, because those things that are unexpected more often rattle souls.

Now, following the judgment of this sort of restraint, you can in accordance with the customs of your predecessors make an exaction upon the Jews, only if, however, nothing else stands in the way. For it seems that, as far as I was able to conjecture from those things which you subsequently asked, your doubt mostly concerned this, that the Jews of your land seem to have nothing except what they acquired through the depravity of usury. And, hence, consequently you ask whether it is not licit to require something from them, and to whom the things thus required are to be restored.

On this matter therefore, it seems the response should be this, since the Jews may not licitly keep those things which they have extorted from others through usury, the consequence is also that if you receive these things from them neither may you licitly keep them, unless perhaps they be things that the Jews had extorted from you or from your ancestors hitherto. If, however, they have things which they extorted from others, these things, once demanded from them, you should restore to those to whom the Jews were bound to restore them. Thus, if certain persons are discovered from whom the Jews extorted usury, it should be restored to them. Otherwise, these usurious monies should be set aside for pious uses according to the council of the diocesan bishop and of other upright men, or even for the common utility of your land if a necessity looms and usefulness calls for it; nor even would it be illicit if you should require such usurious money from the Jews anew, preserving the custom of your predecessors, with this intention that the monies be expended for pious purposes.

Second Response

Now, second you asked, if a Jew should sin, should this person be punished with the financial penalty, since he seems to have nothing aside from usurious money.

To which question it seems the response should be, in line with what has been said before, that it is expeditious that he be punished with a financial penalty, in order that he might not accrue some benefit from his iniquity; it also seems to me that the Jew should be punished with a greater fine (or anyone else who practices usury) than anyone else in a similar case, to make the point that the money taken from him be known to be less his entitlement. Another punishment can be added to this financial punishment, lest this seem to suffice for a penalty, that he cease to possess the money that is owed to others. Nonetheless, money taken from usurers in the name of punishment cannot be kept but should be expended for the aforementioned uses, if they do not have anything other than usurious money.

But if it be said that the princes of countries suffer loss from this, this loss should be imputed to them as coming from their own negligence; for it would be better if they compelled Jews to work for their own living, as they do in parts of Italy, than that, living without occupation they grow rich by usury, and thus their rulers be defrauded of revenue. In the same way, and through their own fault, princes are defrauded of their proper revenues if they permit their subjects to enrich themselves by theft and robbery alone; for they would be bound to restore [to the real owner] whatever they had exacted from them [the thieves].

Third Response

Third it was asked, if he (the Jew) should give money on his own accord, or some peace token, whether it is licit to accept it.

To which the response is, that it seems that it is licit accept it. And it is helpful that money received in this way be returned to those to whom it is owed, or otherwise expended, as has been said before, if they have nothing other than usurious gain.

Fourth response

Fourth you asked, if you receive more from a Jew than Christians require from him, what should be done with what is left over.

The response for this comes from what has been said before. For that Christians do not require from the Jew what is left over can happen in two ways: in one way perhaps because the Jew has things apart from usurious gain, and in this case it is legitimate for you to keep it, observing however the moderation mentioned above (and the same would seem to be said if they from whom usury had been extorted should it later make gifts to them [the Jews] in good will, but only when they [the Jews] show themselves ready to make restitution for usury); in another way it can happen that they from whom the Jews accepted usury have disappeared in the meantime, either through death, or that they are currently living in other countries, and then they are bound to make restitution; but when precise persons do not appear to whom they are bound to make restitution, it seems that the procedure should in line with what has been said above.

Now what has been said about the Jews is also to be understood about Cahors, and anyone else depending upon the depravity of usury.

Fifth response

Fifth you asked about bailiffs and your officials, whether it is legitimate for you to sell them these offices or to receive a loan from them rated until they acquire the same amount in the offices assigned to them.

In responding to this it seems that this question seems to contain two difficulties, of which the first is about the sale of offices. Concerning this question it seems to me that we should consider that the Apostle says (I Cor. 6:12), “many things are allowed that are not useful”; now since you hand over to bailiffs and to your officials nothing but the power of a temporal office, I do not see why it is not legitimate for you to sell offices of this kind, when you sell to such persons about whom it can be presumed that they are useful to the performance of these sorts of offices, and that the office not be sold at so great a price that they are not able to recuperate their money without burdening your subjects.

But nonetheless such selling seems to be not altogether useful. First because it happens frequently that they who are most suited to performing the offices of this sort are poor, such that they would not be able to purchase the office; and even if they are rich, the best persons do not seek these offices nor do they long for the financial gain to be acquired from the office. The result would therefore be that mostly those individuals would get offices in your land who are lesser people, ambitious, and lovers of money; it is probable that they would both oppress your subjects and not so faithfully tend to even your interests. Hence it seems to be more expedient that you select good and well-suited men for such offices, whom you might even compel to serve against their will if it be necessary; because through their goodness and efforts more will accrue to you and your subjects than you would be able to acquire from the aforementioned sale of offices. The kinsman of Moses gave him this counsel (Ex. 18:21-22), “Provide,” he said, “from each people wise men and those fearing God, in whom there is truth, and who hate avarice. And establish from them leaders of hundreds and fifties and tens, who will judge the people for all time.”

But the second doubt surrounding this issue can to be about the loan. It seems that we should say that if, under this pact, they make a loan to receive an office, without doubt the pact is usurious because they receive the power of the office for a loan; hence in this affair you give to them the occasion for sinning, and they are even bound to resign their office acquired in this fashion. If however you give the office freely, and thereafter you receive a loan from them which they are able to recover from their office, this can take place without any sin.

Sixth response

Sixth you asked whether it is legitimate for you to levy taxes upon your Christian subjects or to force loans. In which matter you did consider that the princes of countries are instituted by God not, for sure, that they should seek their own gain but that they should procure the common utility of the people. For towards the blame of certain princes it is said in Ezekiel (Ez. 22:27) “Her princes in her midst are like wolves tearing at prey, hunting the spillage of blood, the destruction of souls, and ravenous gain.” And elsewhere it is said through the same Prophet (Ez. 34:2-3) “Woe to the shepherds of Israel who pasture themselves! Shouldn’t the flocks be pastured by the shepherds? You’ve fed off their milk, covered yourselves with their wool, and the fatted you have killed; but my flock you have not pastured!” And for this reason salaries were instituted for the rulers of countries so that, living off of the salaries, they would refrain from impoverishing their subjects. And hence in the same Prophet, with the Lord commanding, it is said (Ez. 45:8), “let there be for the prince a possession in Israel, and the princes will no longer oppress my people.”

Now it sometimes happens that princes do not have sufficient income for protecting the country and for those other things at hand that the princes reasonably have to pay for; and in such an instance it is right that the subjects provide that whereby their common utility can be procured. And so it is that in some countries, by an age-old practice, the lords impose levies upon their subjects, which, if they are not excessive, can be demanded without sin. According to the Apostle (I Cor. 9:7), no one goes into battle at his own expense; thus the prince who goes into battle for the common utility should also live off of the community’s things or should procures from the businesses of the community, either through the established incomes or, if these sorts of things are lacking and will not be sufficient, through those things that are collected from individuals. And it seems to be similar thinking if some situation emerges anew in which it is necessary to expend much for the common utility or to preserve the genuine standing of the prince, for which his personal income or customary taxes do not suffice – like if enemies invade the land or some similar situation emerges – then also, over and above the usual taxes, the princes of lands can exact some things from their subjects for the common utility. But if they should wish to exact beyond that which has been set for them, solely for the desire of having it, or for disordered and immoderate expenditures, this is in no way allowed to them. Hence John the Baptist said to the soldiers who came to him (Lk 3:14): “Strike no one, cause no calumny, and be content with your wages” (for the income of the princes is like their ?wages,’ which with they should be content such that they do not make further exaction, except in accordance with the reason given, for the sake of the common utility).

Seventh response

Seventh you asked, if your officials without the order of law should extort something for the subjects which makes its way to your hands (or maybe not), what you should do. On this matter the answer is clear, because, if it should come to your hands, you should give it back, either to known persons if you can, or also to expend it for pious uses or for the common utility, if you can’t find the known persons. But if it does not make its way into your hands, you should compel your officials to a like restitution, even if known individuals aren’t available to you from whom they extracted these things, lest from their injustice they should make off with some lucre; in fact these officials ought to be punished by you rather heavily, so that the rest will abstain from similar conduct in the future, because, like Solomon says (Prov. 19:25) “as the noxious man is whipped the imbecile becomes wiser.”

Eighth response

Finally you ask whether it is good that Jews throughout your province are compelled to wear a sign distinguishing them from Christians. The reply to this is plain: that, according to a statute of the general Council, Jews of each sex in all Christian provinces, and all the time, should be distinguished from other people by some clothing. This is also mandated to them by their own law, namely that they make for themselves fringes on the four corners of their cloaks, through which they are distinguished from others.

These are, illustrious and religious Lady, what occurs at present as answers to your questions, in which matters I do not impose my judgment upon you in such a way that I do not rather urge the judgment of the experts to be sustained. May your reign succeed even longer.

Source. Council of Centers on Jewish-Christian Relations – THOMAS AQUINAS, “Letter on the Treatment of Jews” (1271).

Summa Theologica I-II, Question 103. The duration of the ceremonial precepts

Article 1. Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?

Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated above (I-II:101:4). But sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written (Genesis 4:3-4) that “Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord,” and that “Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat.” Noah also “offered holocausts” to the Lord (Genesis 18:20), and Abraham did in like manner (Genesis 22:13). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law.

Objection 2. Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded the Law. For we read (Genesis 13:18) that “Abraham . . . built . . . an altar to the Lord”; and (Genesis 28:18) that “Jacob . . . took the stone . . . and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it.” Therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law.

Objection 3. Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears from Genesis 17. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written (Genesis 14:18) that “Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high God.” Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law.

Objection 4. Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (I-II:100:2, 6, ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written (Genesis 7:2-3): “Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are unclean, two and two.” Therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law.

On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 6:1): “These are the precepts and ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach you.” But they would not have needed to be taught about these things, if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore the legal ceremonies did not precede the Law.

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (I-II:101:2; I-II:102:2), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the divine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our relations with our neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial precepts, as stated above (I-II:99:4). Consequently, as among men in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by Divine authority, but ordained by human reason; so also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but according to the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were gifted with the spirit of prophecy, it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite way, which would be both in keeping with the interior worship, and a suitable token of Christ’s mysteries, which were foreshadowed also by other things that they did, according to 1 Corinthians 10:11: “All . . . things happened to them in figure.” Therefore there were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal ceremonies, because they were not as yet established by legislation.

Reply to Objection 1. The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those things which they had received from Him, and thus to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all.

Reply to Objection 2. They also established certain sacred things, because they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship.

Reply to Objection 3. The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said (John 7:20) that circumcision was “not of Moses, but of his fathers.” Again, among those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence before the Law by human appointment, for the Law allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn.

Reply to Objection 4. The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written (Genesis 9:3): “Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you”: but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used only certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinction in regard to eating; it was not that it was considered illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by any law, but from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some countries, while people partake of them in others.

Article 2. Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?

Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation from sin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written (Exodus 39:21) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and (Leviticus 16:16) that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated “the sanctuary from the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions and . . . their sins.” Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification.

Objection 2. Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to justification, according to Psalm 10:8: “The Lord is just and hath loved justice.” But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to Leviticus 10:19: “How could I . . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart?” Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification.

Objection 3. Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the soul rather than the body, according to Psalm 18:8: “The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls.” But the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated in Leviticus 14. Much more therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by justifying it.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Galatians 2) [The first words of the quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, substituted them for 2:21, which runs thus: ‘If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.’]: “If there had been a law given which could justify [Vulgate: ‘give life’], Christ died in vain,” i.e. without cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not confer justice.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:102:5 ad 4), a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other was corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was said to be unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to cleanse: because they were ordered by the Law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says (Hebrews 9:13) that “the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing of the flesh.” And just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than the soul, so also the ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before (Hebrews 9:10) justices of the flesh: “justices of the flesh,” says he, “being laid on them until the time of correction.”

On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason of this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, “Who taketh away the sins [Vulgate: ‘sin‘] of the world” (John 1:29). And since the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion had not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law could not really contain in themselves a power flowing from Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently they could not cleanse from sin: thus the Apostle says (Hebrews 10:4) that “it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away”; and for this reason he calls them (Galatians 4:9) “weak and needy elements”: weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy, i.e. from the fact that they do not contain grace within themselves.

However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate and crucified; so that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the observance of these ceremonies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered up for sins, not as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which cleansed from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is written (Leviticus 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin “the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him,” as though the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who offered them. It must be observed, however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body, was a figure of that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ.

It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the ceremonies had no power of justification.

Reply to Objection 1. That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, “to the cleansing of the flesh,” as the Apostle states (Hebrews 9:13) in token of that sanctification whereby “Jesus” sanctified “the people by His own blood” (Hebrews 13:12). Moreover, the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is stated to be expiated.

Reply to Objection 2. The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed; not by reason of the things considered in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3. Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the defilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed: hence it is written (Leviticus 14:3-4) that the priest, “going out of the camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be purified to offer,” etc.; whence it is evident that the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies were employed for the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if a priest were to err in his judgment, the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water “on which” the priest had “heaped curses,” as stated in Numbers 5:19-27.

Article 3. Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?

Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written (Baruch 4:1): “This is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever.” But the legal ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to last for ever.

Objection 2. Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, who has been cleansed, to make this offering (Matthew 8:4). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ’s coming.

Objection 3. Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes, inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased.

Objection 4. Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham’s faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing of creation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as state above (I-II:102:4 ad 10; Article 5, Reply to Objection 1). But Abraham’s faith is ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other Divine favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least circumcision and the other legal solemnities should not have ceased.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Colossians 2:16-17): “Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come”: and (Hebrews 8:13): “In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end.”

I answer that, All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above (I-II:101:1-2). Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship, in which a threefold state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, both in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them—in both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New Law. The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed.

In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but “thanksgiving and voice of praise” (Isaiah 51:3). Hence it is written concerning the city of the Blessed (Apocalypse 21:22): “I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb.” Proportionately, therefore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed the second and third states, had need to cease at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping with the state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present.

Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is said to be “for ever” simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed.

Reply to Objection 2. The mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in Christ’s Passion: hence Our Lord said then: “It is consummated” (John 19:30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ “the veil of the temple was rent” (Matthew 27:51). Hence, before Christ’s Passion, while Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but was not as yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies.

Reply to Objection 3. The literal reasons already given (I-II:102) for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to come, both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto.

Reply to Objection 4. The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed in God’s promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations were to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham’s faith by means of circumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to be declared by means of another sign, viz. Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place of circumcision, according to the saying of the Apostle (Colossians 2:11-12): “You are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism.”

As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its place is taken by the “Lord’s Day,” which recalls the beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors granted us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover gave place to the feast of Christ’s Passion and Resurrection: the feast of Pentecost when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to the feasts of the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to the feast of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast of All Hallows.

Article 4. Whether since Christ’s Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that since Christ’s Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were “endued with power from on high” (Luke 24:49). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated (Acts 16:3) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and (Acts 21:26) that Paul, at the advice of James, “took the men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into the temple, giving notice of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for every one of them.” Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin.

Objection 2. Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church complied with this observance; for it is stated (Galatians 2:12) that, “when” certain men “had come” to Antioch, Peter “withdrew and separated himself” from the Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ’s Passion without committing mortal sin.

Objection 3. Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles should observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (Acts 15:28-29): “It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication.” Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ’s Passion without committing mortal sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Galatians 5:2): “If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.” But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ’s fruit. Therefore since Christ’s Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies.

I answer that, All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by them was it said: “Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son,” where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she “conceived and bore.” In like manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, 16), who says: “It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments were a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in which Christians share, are the actual representation.”

Reply to Objection 1. On this point there seems to have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, 11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time previous to Christ’s Passion, during which the legal ceremonies were neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful to observe them. But immediately after Christ’s Passion they began to be not only dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only by a kind of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however, is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed them without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health’s sake, not with the intention of observing legal circumcision.

But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; therefore Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz. from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who were converted from heathendom to Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality.

The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, while converted heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show that there is a difference between these rites. For heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by God for all time; whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ’s Passion, being instituted by God as a figure of Christ.

Reply to Objection 2. According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution: because in the canonical Scripture (viz. Galatians 2:11), wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter “was to be blamed.” Consequently it is true that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal ceremonial for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the Gentiles.

Reply to Objection 3. Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the prohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a mystical sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezekiel 44:31 (“The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead”): “He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts.”

But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should have been forbidden more than the others.

We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because blood and things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that “not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man” (Matthew 15:11); and that “nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving” (1 Timothy 4:4). With regard to fornication a special prohibition was made, because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful.

Source. New Advent – The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight.

Summa Theologica I-II, Question 104. The judicial precepts

Article 1. Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neighbor?

Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial precepts take their name from “judgment.” But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor.

Objection 2. Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above (I-II:99:4). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.

Objection 3. Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one’s neighbor, as stated above (I-II:99:4; I-II:101:1). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which we have already spoken (I-II:102:6, ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.

On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezekiel 18:8) among other works of a good and just man, that “he hath executed true judgment between man and man.” But judicial precepts are so called from “judgment.” Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between man and man.

I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above (I-II:95:2; I-II:99:4), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called “moral” precepts: since human morals are based on reason. At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but from some institution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man’s subordination to God, they are called “ceremonial” precepts: but when they refer to man’s relations to other men, they are called “judicial” precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man’s relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.

Reply to Objection 1. Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding force from the mere dictate of reason.

Reply to Objection 3. Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master, since a slave “is his master’s in all that he is,” as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law.

Article 2. Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?

Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the judicial and ceremonial precepts.

Objection 2. Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.

Objection 3. Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are above our reason, as stated above (I-II:101:2 ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should not have been figurative.

On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense (Exodus 21).

I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally that it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Corinthians 10:11: “All . . . things happened to them in figure.”

Reply to Objection 1. The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2. The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.

Reply to Objection 3. In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative.

Article 3. Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?

Objection 1. It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now “justice is perpetual and immortal” (Wisdom 1:15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever.

Objection 2. Further, divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.

Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Hebrews 7:18) that “there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof.” Now this is true of the ceremonial precept, which “could [Vulgate: ‘can’] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh,” as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 9:9-10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Hebrews 7:12) that “the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law.” But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer in force.

I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only “dead,” but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus.

The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above (Article 2). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Galatians 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet come.

Reply to Objection 1. The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind.

Reply to Objection 2. The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also.

Reply to Objection 3. Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also.

Article 4. Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts?

Objection 1. It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.

Objection 2. Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial precepts.

Objection 3. Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing some as “sacrifices,” others as “observances.” But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have no distinct division.

On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division.

I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is directed.

Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people’s sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.

Reply to Objection 1. Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above (I-II:100:3): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them.

Reply to Objection 3. The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law.

Source. New Advent – The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight.

Summa Theologica II-II, Question 10. Unbelief in general

Article 1. Whether unbelief is a sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that “to be capable to having faith, just as to be capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a sin.

Objection 2. Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man’s power to avoid unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says (Romans 10:14): “How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?” Therefore unbelief does not seem to be a sin.

Objection 3. Further, as stated above (I-II:84:4), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin.

On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.

I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises it, according to Isaiah 53:1: “Who hath believed our report?” It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin.

If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (John 15:22) “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin“; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as “referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ.”

Reply to Objection 1. To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is part of human nature that man’s mind should not thwart his inner instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is contrary to nature.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation.

Reply to Objection 3. Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory.”

It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.

Article 2. Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?

Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.

Objection 2. Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief is in the will.

Objection 3. Further, a gloss [Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Corinthians 11:14 “Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light,” says that if “a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a good angel.” This seems to be because of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it does not reside in the intellect.

On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:74:1; I-II:74:2), sin is said to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.

Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which way every sin is said to be in the will.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2. The will’s contempt causes the intellect’s dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.

Reply to Objection 3. He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does not dissent from a matter of faith, because “his bodily senses are deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right judgment” as the gloss observes [Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But, according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin.

Article 3. Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): “I should hesitate to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact that he is a heretic.” But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.

Objection 2. Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not, seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin: for the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:12-13): “I . . . before was a blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.” Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

Objection 3. Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment, according to Deuteronomy 25:2: “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Now a greater punishment is due to believers than to unbelievers, according to Hebrews 10:29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?” Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on John 15:22, “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin,” says (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): “Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For this,” viz. infidelity, “is the sin to which all others may be traced.” Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.

I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as stated above (I-II:71:6; I-II:73:3). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him.

Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further on (II-II:20:3; II-II:34:2 ad 2; II-II:39:2 ad 3).

Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic’s sin is more grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.

Reply to Objection 2. Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect it is a most grave sin. On respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.

Reply to Objection 3. An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin.

Article 4. Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. Because a gloss on Romans 14:23, “All that is not of faith is sin,” says: “The whole life of unbelievers is a sin.” Now the life of unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin.

Objection 2. Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no action can be good.

Objection 3. Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.

On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts 10:4-31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:85:2; I-II:85:4) mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices.

Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief.

Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same authority adds: “Because every one that lives or acts according to his unbelief, sins grievously.”

Reply to Objection 2. Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a connatural good.

Reply to Objection 3. Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.

Article 5. Whether there are several species of unbelief?

Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another, they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several species of unbelief, according to the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves.

Objection 2. Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our consideration.

Objection 3. Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.

On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue, because “good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:55:4; I-II:64:1), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. On this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite.

Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.

If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).

Reply to Objection 1. The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the various species of unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.

Reply to Objection 3. Since faith is one because it believes in many things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily diseases.

Article 6. Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?

Objection 1. It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all.

Objection 2. Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest.

Objection 3. Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who receive neither Testament.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Peter 2:21): “It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back.” Now the heathens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 5), two things may be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. On this way the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.

The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of matters of faith. On this respect, since heathens err on more points than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.

Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above (Article 1) unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (Article 1) seems rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Article 7. Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?

Objection 1. It would seem that one ought not to dispute with unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Timothy 2:14): “Contend not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers.” But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with unbelievers.

Objection 2. Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the canons [De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus: “It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once been judged and disposed of.” Now all matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters of faith.

Objection 3. Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of faith.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22-29) that “Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews,” and that “he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks.”

I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice.

On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there are not unbelievers. On the first case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): “Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might have been instructed.” On the other hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to say against the faith.

Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than of sound speeches.

Reply to Objection 2. That law forbade those public disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are for the safeguarding thereof.

Reply to Objection 3. One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known, and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending the faith, according to 1 Peter 3:15: “Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you [Vulgate: ‘Of that hope which is in you’ St. Thomas‘ reading is apparently taken from Bede].” Sometimes again, it is necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: “That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.”

Article 8. Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?

Objection 1. It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is written (Matthew 13:28) that the servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: “Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?” and that he answered: “No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it”: on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): “Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily slay many innocent persons.” Therefore it seems that for the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Objection 2. Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis): “The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for the future, none are to be compelled to believe.” Therefore, in like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.

Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that “it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is willing.” Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Objection 4. It is said in God’s person (Ezekiel 18:32 [Ezekiel 33:11]): “I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulgate: ‘of him that dieth’].” Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above (I-II:19:9 and I-II:19:10). Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put to death.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke 14:23): “Go out into the highways and hedges; and compel them to come in.” Now men enter into the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be compelled to the faith.

I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ’s faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ.

On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.

Reply to Objection 1. Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of himself: “It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder.” Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord’s words, “Suffer both to grow until the harvest,” must be gathered from those which precede, “lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with it.” For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) “these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say, when a man’s crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken.”

Reply to Objection 2. Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same chapter.

Reply to Objection 3. Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): “What do these people mean by crying out continually: ‘We may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel?’ They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught Him.”

Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says in the same letter, “none of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations.”

Article 9. Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?

Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 10:27): “If any of them that believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before you.” And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad Heb.): “If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any reservation.” Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate with him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.

Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 5:12): “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” Now unbelievers are without. When, therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers.

Objection 3. Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully communicate with them.

On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 7:2-3): “Thou shalt make no league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages with them”: and a gloss on Leviticus 15:19, “The woman who at the return of the month,” etc. says: “It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have any dealings with them.”

I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be gathered from the Apostle’s words (1 Corinthians 5:6). For after he had pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: “Know you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?” and afterwards he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of the Church when he says (1 Corinthians 5:12): “Do not you judge them that are within?”

Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication on both.

With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or to communicate with them without necessity.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2. The Church does not exercise judgment against unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them: but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church, for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication with certain unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 3. There is more probability that a servant who is ruled by his master’s commands, will be converted to the faith of his master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord’s command (Matthew 18:8): “If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee.”

With regard to the argument in the contrary [The Leonine Edition gives this solution before the Reply to Objection 2 sense the reply is that the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes on (Deuteronomy 7:4): “For she will turn away thy son from following Me.”

Article 10. Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?

Objection 1. It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Timothy 6:1): “Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor“: and it is clear that he is speaking of unbelievers, since he adds (1 Timothy 6:2): “But they that have believing masters, let them not despise them.” Moreover it is written (1 Peter 2:18): “Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward.” Now this command would not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.

Objection 2. Further, all the members of a prince’s household are his subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes’ households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): “All the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar’s household,” referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.

Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave is his master’s instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even as a craftsman’s laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever’s farm. Therefore unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.

On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 6:1): “Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust,” i.e. unbelievers, “and not before the saints?” Therefore it seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.

I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any capacity whatever.

Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force: and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faithful.

Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into children of God.

This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without paying any price, if he should be a “vernaculus,” i.e. born in slavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Matthew 17:25-26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because “the children are free,” yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their masters, adds, “lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed.”

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2. The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor’s household, that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.

Reply to Objection 3. Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas the craftsman’s laborer is subject to him for certain special works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 1 Kings 5:6. Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.

Article 11. Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?

Objection 1. It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss observes on Romans 1:32: “Not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them.” Therefore it is a sin to tolerate their rites.

Objection 2. Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because a gloss on Galatians 5:1, “Be not held again under the yoke of bondage,” says: “The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry.” But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.

Objection 3. Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above (Article 3). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be tolerated.

On the contrary, Gregory [Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: “They should be allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages observed them.”

I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): “If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust.” Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there follows this good—that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.

On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Article 12. Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will?

Objection 1. It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will. For the bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man, according to Matthew 19:6: “What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” And yet the marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 7:15): “If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases”: and a canon [Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i] says that “if the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation.” Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents’ authority over their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against their parents’ will.

Objection 2. Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith.

Objection 3. Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their parents’ wishes.

Objection 4. Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.

Objection 5. Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to the words of Ezekiel 33:6 about the man who “sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet.” Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.

On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be baptized against their parents’ will.

I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against their parents’ wishes, in contradiction to the Church’s custom observed hitherto.

There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.

The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father’s care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents’ custody, or anything done to it against its parents’ wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its parents’ wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents’ duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason.

Reply to Objection 1. In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other’s consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.

Reply to Objection 2. No one should be snatched from natural death against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of everlasting death.

Reply to Objection 3. Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.

Reply to Objection 4. Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents’ reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God.

Reply to Objection 5. The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezekiel 3:17): “I have made thee a watchman to the children [Vulgate: ‘house’] of Israel.” On the other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation.

Source. New Advent – The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight.

Summa Theologica II-II, Question 108. Vengeance

Article 1. Whether vengeance is lawful?

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is God’s sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written (Deuteronomy 32:35, Romans 12:19): “Revenge to Me, and I will repay.” Therefore all vengeance is unlawful.

Objection 2. Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Canticles 2:2, “As the lily among the thorns,” says: “He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one.” Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked.

Objection 3. Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.

Objection 4. Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom [Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: “Let us learn after Christ’s example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God’s wrongs, not even by listening to them.” Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.

Objection 5. Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written (Sirach 26:5-7): “Of three things my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and a false calumny.” But vengeance should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Matthew 13:29-30, “Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow,” says that “a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign.” Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.

On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for it is written (Luke 18:7): “Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night?” as if to say: “He will indeed.” Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.

I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Romans 12:21): “Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.”

If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed.

Reply to Objection 1. He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Romans 13:4) of the earthly prince that “he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God’s and therefore sins.

Reply to Objection 2. The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: “It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God’s wrongs is most wicked.”

Reply to Objection 3. The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.

Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him (2 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (2 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).

Reply to Objection 5. When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude—thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel (Exodus 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed (Genesis 19)—or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.

Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord (Numbers 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the multitude.

On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment.

Article 2. Whether vengeance is a special virtue?

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a special virtue.

Objection 2. Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue.

Objection 3. Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of justice.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by “vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure” [‘Obscurum’ Cicero wrote ‘obfuturum’ but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis] “(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it.” Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1. Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.

Reply to Objection 2. Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in Ev.), “there are no green leaves on the bough of good works, unless charity be the root.”

Reply to Objection 3. Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written (Proverbs 13:24): “He that spareth the rod hateth his son.” But the virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with regard to all the circumstances.

Article 3. Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among men?

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot him. But our Lord forbade (Matthew 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners should not be put to death.

Objection 2. Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death: and this is evidently false.

Objection 3. Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be inflicted for a sin.

On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as appears from what we have said above (I-II:105:2).

I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name. Wherefore, according to Augustine’s reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), “Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment”: namely, “death,” whereby man is deprived of life; “stripes,” “retaliation,” or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety; “slavery,” and “imprisonment,” whereby he is deprived of freedom; “exile” whereby he is banished from his country; “fines,” whereby he is mulcted in his riches; “ignominy,” whereby he loses his good name.

Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.

Reply to Objection 2. All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.

Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time as the sin, makes man’s will avers to sin: because the fear of punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.

Article 4. Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Exodus 20:5, “I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation.” Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Genesis 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (2 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said (Matthew 27:25): “His blood be upon us and upon our children.” Moreover we read (Joshua 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Samuel 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.

Objection 2. Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man’s power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power; thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.

Objection 3. Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their parents (Genesis 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their children were swallowed up together with them (Numbers 16). Moreover, dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Samuel 15). Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.

Objection 4. Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.

Objection 5. Further Ambrose says on Luke 5 that “the ship in which Judas was, was in distress”; wherefore “Peter, who was calm in the security of his own merits, was in distress about those of others.” But Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes punished without having voluntarily deserved it.

On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it voluntarily.

I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated above (I-II:81:1), it follows that no one is punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.

It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life, because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation.

Reply to Objection 1. A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for another man’s sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master. Secondly, when one person’s sin is transmitted to another, either by “imitation,” as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way of “merit,” as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to Job 34:30, “Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?” Hence the people of Israel were punished for David’s sin in numbering the people (2 Samuel 24). This may also happen through some kind of “consent” or “connivance”: thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, “Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation,” seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take vengeance on them.

Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God’s hidden judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.

First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his, disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered from receiving sacred orders.

Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics.

Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent.

Reply to Objection 3. By the judgment of God children are punished in temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.

Reply to Objection 4. An act done through compulsion of fear is not involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated above (I-II:6:5-6).

Reply to Objection 5. The other apostles were distressed about the sin of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Replies to Objections 1 and 2).

Source. New Advent – The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight.

Summa Theologica III, Question 42. Christ’s doctrine

Article 1. Whether Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles?

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles. For it is written (Isaiah 49:6): “It is a small thing that thou shouldst be My servant to raise up the tribes of Israel [Vulgate: ‘Jacob‘] and to convert the dregs of Jacob [Vulgate: ‘Israel‘]: behold, I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation even to the farthest part of the earth.” But Christ gave light and salvation through His doctrine. Therefore it seems that it was “a small thing” that He preached to Jews alone, and not to the Gentiles.

Objection 2. Further, as it is written (Matthew 7:29): “He was teaching them as one having power.” Now the power of doctrine is made more manifest in the instruction of those who, like the Gentiles, have received no tidings whatever; hence the Apostle says (Romans 15:20): “I have so preached the [Vulgate: ‘this’] gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man’s foundation.” Therefore much rather should Christ have preached to the Gentiles than to the Jews.

Objection 3. Further, it is more useful to instruct many than one. But Christ instructed some individual Gentiles, such as the Samaritan woman (John 4) and the Chananaean woman (Matthew 15). Much more reason, therefore, was there for Christ to preach to the Gentiles in general.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Matthew 15:24): “I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel.” And (Romans 10:15) it is written: “How shall they preach unless they be sent?” Therefore Christ should not have preached to the Gentiles.

I answer that, It was fitting that Christ’s preaching, whether through Himself or through His apostles, should be directed at first to the Jews alone. First, in order to show that by His coming the promises were fulfilled which had been made to the Jews of old, and not to the Gentiles. Thus the Apostle says (Romans 15:8): “I say that Christ . . . was minister of the circumcision,” i.e. the apostle and preacher of the Jews, “for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers.”

Secondly, in order to show that His coming was of God; because, as is written Romans 13:1: “Those things which are of God are well ordered [Vulgate: ‘those that are, are ordained of God‘]” [See Scriptural Index on this passage]. Now the right order demanded that the doctrine of Christ should be made known first to the Jews, who, by believing in and worshiping one God, were nearer to God, and that it should be transmitted through them to the Gentiles: just as in the heavenly hierarchy the Divine enlightenment comes to the lower angels through the higher. Hence on Matthew 15:24, “I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost in the house of Israel,” Jerome says: “He does not mean by this that He was not sent to the Gentiles, but that He was sent to the Jews first.” And so we read (Isaiah 66:19): “I will send of them that shall be saved,” i.e. of the Jews, “to the Gentiles . . . and they shall declare My glory unto the Gentiles.”

Thirdly, in order to deprive the Jews of ground for quibbling. Hence on Matthew 10:5, “Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles.” Jerome says: “It behooved Christ’s coming to be announced to the Jews first, lest they should have a valid excuse, and say that they had rejected our Lord because He had sent His apostles to the Gentiles and Samaritans.”

Fourthly, because it was through the triumph of the cross that Christ merited power and lordship over the Gentiles. Hence it is written (Apocalypse 2:26-28): “He that shall overcome . . . I will give him power over the nations . . . as I also have received of My Father”; and that because He became “obedient unto the death of the cross, God hath exalted Him . . . that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow . . .” and that “every tongue should confess Him” (Philippians 2:8-11). Consequently He did not wish His doctrine to be preached to the Gentiles before His Passion: it was after His Passion that He said to His disciples (Matthew 28:19): “Going, teach ye all nations.” For this reason it was that when, shortly before His Passion, certain Gentiles wished to see Jesus, He said: “Unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone: but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit” (John 12:20-25); and as Augustine says, commenting on this passage: “He called Himself the grain of wheat that must be mortified by the unbelief of the Jews, multiplied by the faith of the nations.”

Reply to Objection 1. Christ was given to be the light and salvation of the Gentiles through His disciples, whom He sent to preach to them.

Reply to Objection 2. It is a sign, not of lesser, but of greater power to do something by means of others rather than by oneself. And thus the Divine power of Christ was specially shown in this, that He bestowed on the teaching of His disciples such a power that they converted the Gentiles to Christ, although these had heard nothing of Him.

Now the power of Christ’s teaching is to be considered in the miracles by which He confirmed His doctrine, in the efficacy of His persuasion, and in the authority of His words, for He spoke as being Himself above the Law when He said: “But I say to you” (Matthew 5:22-44); and, again, in the force of His righteousness shown in His sinless manner of life.

Reply to Objection 3. Just as it was unfitting that Christ should at the outset make His doctrine known to the Gentiles equally with the Jews, in order that He might appear as being sent to the Jews, as to the first-born people; so neither was it fitting for Him to neglect the Gentiles altogether, lest they should be deprived of the hope of salvation. For this reason certain individual Gentiles were admitted, on account of the excellence of their faith and devotedness.

Article 2. Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them?

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them. For, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): “In the Man Jesus Christ, a model of life is given us by the Son of God.” But we should avoid offending not only the faithful, but even unbelievers, according to 1 Corinthians 10:32: “Be without offense to the Jews, and to the Gentiles, and to the Church of God.” Therefore it seems that, in His teaching, Christ should also have avoided giving offense to the Jews.

Objection 2. Further, no wise man should do anything that will hinder the result of his labor. Now through the disturbance which His teaching occasioned among the Jews, it was deprived of its results; for it is written (Luke 11:53-54) that when our Lord reproved the Pharisees and Scribes, they “began vehemently to urge Him, end to oppress His mouth about many things; lying in wait for Him, and seeking to catch something from His mouth, that they might accuse Him.” It seems therefore unfitting that He should have given them offense by His teaching.

Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Timothy 5:1): “An ancient man rebuke not; but entreat him as a father.” But the priests and princes of the Jews were the elders of that people. Therefore it seems that they should not have been rebuked with severity.

On the contrary, It was foretold (Isaiah 8:14) that Christ would be “for a stone of stumbling and for a rock of offense to the two houses of Israel.”

I answer that, The salvation of the multitude is to be preferred to the peace of any individuals whatsoever. Consequently, when certain ones, by their perverseness, hinder the salvation of the multitude, the preacher and the teacher should not fear to offend those men, in order that he may insure the salvation of the multitude. Now the Scribes and Pharisees and the princes of the Jews were by their malice a considerable hindrance to the salvation of the people, both because they opposed themselves to Christ’s doctrine, which was the only way to salvation, and because their evil ways corrupted the morals of the people. For which reason our Lord, undeterred by their taking offense, publicly taught the truth which they hated, and condemned their vices. Hence we read (Matthew 15:12,14) that when the disciples of our Lord said: “Dost Thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were scandalized?” He answered: “Let them alone: they are blind and leaders of the blind; and if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit.”

Reply to Objection 1. A man ought so to avoid giving offense, as neither by wrong deed or word to be the occasion of anyone’s downfall. “But if scandal arise from truth, the scandal should be borne rather than the truth be set aside,” as Gregory says (Hom. vii in Ezech.).

Reply to Objection 2. By publicly reproving the Scribes and Pharisees, Christ promoted rather than hindered the effect of His teaching. Because when the people came to know the vices of those men, they were less inclined to be prejudiced against Christ by hearing what was said of Him by the Scribes and Pharisees, who were ever withstanding His doctrine.

Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the Apostle is to be understood of those elders whose years are reckoned not only in age and authority, but also in probity; according to Numbers 11:16: “Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel, whom thou knowest to be ancients . . . of the people.” But if by sinning openly they turn the authority of their years into an instrument of wickedness, they should be rebuked openly and severely, as also Daniel says (Daniel 13:52): “O thou that art grown old in evil days,” etc.

Article 3. Whether Christ should have taught all things openly?

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should not have taught all things openly. For we read that He taught many things to His disciples apart: as is seen clearly in the sermon at the Supper. Wherefore He said: “That which you heard in the ear in the chambers shall be preached on the housetops” [St. Thomas, probably quoting from memory, combines Matthew 10:27 with Luke 12:3]. Therefore He did not teach all things openly.

Objection 2. Further, the depths of wisdom should not be expounded save to the perfect, according to 1 Corinthians 2:6: “We speak wisdom among the perfect.” Now Christ’s doctrine contained the most profound wisdom. Therefore it should not have been made known to the imperfect crowd.

Objection 3. Further, it comes to the same, to hide the truth, whether by saying nothing or by making use of a language that is difficult to understand. Now Christ, by speaking to the multitudes a language they would not understand, hid from them the truth that He preached; since “without parables He did not speak to them” (Matthew 13:34). In the same way, therefore, He could have hidden it from them by saying nothing at all.

On the contrary, He says Himself (John 18:20): “In secret I have spoken nothing.”

I answer that, Anyone’s doctrine may be hidden in three ways. First, on the part of the intention of the teacher, who does not wish to make his doctrine known to many, but rather to hide it. And this may happen in two ways—sometimes through envy on the part of the teacher, who desires to excel in his knowledge, wherefore he is unwilling to communicate it to others. But this was not the case with Christ, in whose person the following words are spoken (Wisdom 7:13): “Which I have learned without guile, and communicate without envy, and her riches I hide not.” But sometimes this happens through the vileness of the things taught; thus Augustine says on John 16:12: “There are some things so bad that no sort of human modesty can bear them.” Wherefore of heretical doctrine it is written (Proverbs 9:17): “Stolen waters are sweeter.” Now, Christ’s doctrine is “not of error nor of uncleanness” (1 Thessalonians 2:3). Wherefore our Lord says (Mark 4:21): “Doth a candle,” i.e. true and pure doctrine, “come in to be put under a bushel?”

Secondly, doctrine is hidden because it is put before few. And thus, again, did Christ teach nothing in secret: for He propounded His entire doctrine either to the whole crowd or to His disciples gathered together. Hence Augustine says on John 18:20: “How can it be said that He speaks in secret when He speaks before so many men? . . . especially if what He says to few He wishes through them to be made known to many?”

Thirdly, doctrine is hidden, as to the manner in which it is propounded. And thus Christ spoke certain things in secret to the crowds, by employing parables in teaching them spiritual mysteries which they were either unable or unworthy to grasp: and yet it was better for them to be instructed in the knowledge of spiritual things, albeit hidden under the garb of parables, than to be deprived of it altogether. Nevertheless our Lord expounded the open and unveiled truth of these parables to His disciples, so that they might hand it down to others worthy of it; according to 2 Timothy 2:2: “The things which thou hast heard of me by many witnesses, the same command to faithful men, who shall be fit to teach others.” This is foreshadowed, Numbers 4, where the sons of Aaron are commanded to wrap up the sacred vessels that were to be carried by the Levites.

Reply to Objection 1. As Hilary says, commenting on the passage quoted, “we do not read that our Lord was wont to preach at night, and expound His doctrine in the dark: but He says this because His speech is darkness to the carnal-minded, and His words are night to the unbeliever. His meaning, therefore, is that whatever He said we also should say in the midst of unbelievers, by openly believing and professing it.”

Or, according to Jerome, He speaks comparatively—that is to say, because He was instructing them in Judea, which was a small place compared with the whole world, where Christ’s doctrine was to be published by the preaching of the apostles.

Reply to Objection 2. By His doctrine our Lord did not make known all the depths of His wisdom, neither to the multitudes, nor, indeed, to His disciples, to whom He said (John 16:12): “I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now.” Yet whatever things out of His wisdom He judged it right to make known to others, He expounded, not in secret, but openly; although He was not understood by all. Hence Augustine says on John 18:20: “We must understand this, ‘I have spoken openly to the world,’ as though our Lord had said, ‘Many have heard Me’ . . . and, again, it was not ‘openly,’ because they did not understand.”

Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, our Lord spoke to the multitudes in parables, because they were neither able nor worthy to receive the naked truth, which He revealed to His disciples.

And when it is said that “without parables He did not speak to them,” according to Chrysostom (Hom. xlvii in Matth.), we are to understand this of that particular sermon, since on other occasions He said many things to the multitude without parables. Or, as Augustine says (De Qq. Evang., qu. xvii), this means, “not that He spoke nothing literally, but that He scarcely ever spoke without introducing a parable, although He also spoke some things in the literal sense.”

Article 4. Whether Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing?

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing. For the purpose of writing is to hand down doctrine to posterity. Now Christ’s doctrine was destined to endure for ever, according to Luke 21:33: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away.” Therefore it seems that Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing.

Objection 2. Further, the Old Law was a foreshadowing of Christ, according to Hebrews 10:1: “The Law has [Vulgate: ‘having’] a shadow of the good things to come.” Now the Old Law was put into writing by God, according to Exodus 24:12: “I will give thee” two “tables of stone and the law, and the commandments which I have written.” Therefore it seems that Christ also should have put His doctrine into writing.

Objection 3. Further, to Christ, who came to enlighten them that sit in darkness (Luke 1:79), it belonged to remove occasions of error, and to open out the road to faith. Now He would have done this by putting His teaching into writing: for Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. i) that “some there are who wonder why our Lord wrote nothing, so that we have to believe what others have written about Him. Especially do those pagans ask this question who dare not blame or blaspheme Christ, and who ascribe to Him most excellent, but merely human, wisdom. These say that the disciples made out the Master to be more than He really was when they said that He was the Son of God and the Word of God, by whom all things were made.” And farther on he adds: “It seems as though they were prepared to believe whatever He might have written of Himself, but not what others at their discretion published about Him.” Therefore it seems that Christ should have Himself committed His doctrine to writing.

On the contrary, No books written by Him were to be found in the canon of Scripture.

I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should not commit His doctrine to writing. First, on account of His dignity: for the more excellent the teacher, the more excellent should be his manner of teaching. Consequently it was fitting that Christ, as the most excellent of teachers, should adopt that manner of teaching whereby His doctrine is imprinted on the hearts of His hearers; wherefore it is written (Matthew 7:29) that “He was teaching them as one having power.” And so it was that among the Gentiles, Pythagoras and Socrates, who were teachers of great excellence, were unwilling to write anything. For writings are ordained, as to an end, unto the imprinting of doctrine in the hearts of the hearers.

Secondly, on account of the excellence of Christ’s doctrine, which cannot be expressed in writing; according to John 21:25: “There are also many other things which Jesus did: which, if they were written everyone, the world itself, I think, would not be able to contain the books that should be written.” Which Augustine explains by saying: “We are not to believe that in respect of space the world could not contain them . . . but that by the capacity of the readers they could not be comprehended.” And if Christ had committed His doctrine to writing, men would have had no deeper thought of His doctrine than that which appears on the surface of the writing.

Thirdly, that His doctrine might reach all in an orderly manner: Himself teaching His disciples immediately, and they subsequently teaching others, by preaching and writing: whereas if He Himself had written, His doctrine would have reached all immediately.

Hence it is said of Wisdom (Proverbs 9:3) that “she hath sent her maids to invite to the tower.” It is to be observed, however, that, as Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. i), some of the Gentiles thought that Christ wrote certain books treating of the magic art whereby He worked miracles: which art is condemned by the Christian learning. “And yet they who claim to have read those books of Christ do none of those things which they marvel at His doing according to those same books. Moreover, it is by a Divine judgment that they err so far as to assert that these books were, as it were, entitled as letters to Peter and Paul, for that they found them in several places depicted in company with Christ. No wonder that the inventors were deceived by the painters: for as long as Christ lived in the mortal flesh with His disciples, Paul was no disciple of His.”

Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says in the same book: “Christ is the head of all His disciples who are members of His body. Consequently, when they put into writing what He showed forth and said to them, by no means must we say that He wrote nothing: since His members put forth that which they knew under His dictation. For at His command they, being His hands, as it were, wrote whatever He wished us to read concerning His deeds and words.”

Reply to Objection 2. Since the old Law was given under the form of sensible signs, therefore also was it fittingly written with sensible signs. But Christ’s doctrine, which is “the law of the spirit of life” (Romans 8:2), had to be “written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart,” as the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 3:3).

Reply to Objection 3. Those who were unwilling to believe what the apostles wrote of Christ would have refused to believe the writings of Christ, whom they deemed to work miracles by the magic art.

Source. New Advent – The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight.

Summa Theologica III, Question 47. The efficient cause of Christ’s passion

Article 1. Whether Christ was slain by another or by Himself?

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not slain by another, but by Himself. For He says Himself (John 10:18): “No men taketh My life from Me, but I lay it down of Myself.” But he is said to kill another who takes away his life. Consequently, Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.

Objection 2. Further, those slain by others sink gradually from exhausted nature, and this is strikingly apparent in the crucified: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): “Those who were crucified were tormented with a lingering death.” But this did not happen in Christ’s case, since “crying out, with a loud voice, He yielded up the ghost” (Matthew 27:50). Therefore Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.

Objection 3. Further, those slain by others suffer a violent death, and hence die unwillingly, because violent is opposed to voluntary. But Augustine says (De Trin. iv): “Christ’s spirit did not quit the flesh unwillingly, but because He willed it, when He willed it, and as He willed it.” Consequently Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke 18:33): “After they have scourged Him, they will put him to death.”

I answer that, A thing may cause an effect in two ways: in the first instance by acting directly so as to produce the effect; and in this manner Christ’s persecutors slew Him because they inflicted on Him what was a sufficient cause of death, and with the intention of slaying Him, and the effect followed, since death resulted from that cause. In another way someone causes an effect indirectly—that is, by not preventing it when he can do so; just as one person is said to drench another by not closing the window through which the shower is entering: and in this way Christ was the cause of His own Passion and death. For He could have prevented His Passion and death. Firstly, by holding His enemies in check, so that they would not have been eager to slay Him, or would have been powerless to do so. Secondly, because His spirit had the power of preserving His fleshly nature from the infliction of any injury; and Christ’s soul had this power, because it was united in unity of person with the Divine Word, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv). Therefore, since Christ’s soul did not repel the injury inflicted on His body, but willed His corporeal nature to succumb to such injury, He is said to have laid down His life, or to have died voluntarily.

Reply to Objection 1. When we hear the words, “No man taketh away My life from Me,” we must understand “against My will”: for that is properly said to be “taken away” which one takes from someone who is unwilling and unable to resist.

Reply to Objection 2. In order for Christ to show that the Passion inflicted by violence did not take away His life, He preserved the strength of His bodily nature, so that at the last moment He was able to cry out with a loud voice: and hence His death should be computed among His other miracles. Accordingly it is written (Mark 15:39): “And the centurion who stood over against Him, seeing that crying out in this manner, He had given up the ghost, said: Indeed, this man was the Son of God.” It was also a subject of wonder in Christ’s death that He died sooner than the others who were tormented with the same suffering. Hence John says (19:32) that “they broke the legs of the first, and of the other that was crucified with Him,” that they might die more speedily; “but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead, they did not break His legs.” Mark also states (15:44) that “Pilate wondered that He should be already dead.” For as of His own will His bodily nature kept its vigor to the end, so likewise, when He willed, He suddenly succumbed to the injury inflicted.

Reply to Objection 3. Christ at the same time suffered violence in order to die, and died, nevertheless, voluntarily; because violence was inflicted on His body, which, however, prevailed over His body only so far as He willed it.

Article 2. Whether Christ died out of obedience?

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not die out of obedience. For obedience is referred to a command. But we do not read that Christ was commanded to suffer. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience.

Objection 2. Further, a man is said to do from obedience what he does from necessity of precept. But Christ did not suffer necessarily, but voluntarily. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience.

Objection 3. Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than obedience. But we read that Christ suffered out of charity, according to Ephesians 5:2: “Walk in love, as Christ also has loved us, and delivered Himself up for us.” Therefore Christ’s Passion ought to be ascribed rather to charity than to obedience.

On the contrary, It is written (Philippians 2:8): “He became obedient” to the Father “unto death.”

I answer that, It was befitting that Christ should suffer out of obedience. First of all, because it was in keeping with human justification, that “as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners: so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just,” as is written Romans 5:19. Secondly, it was suitable for reconciling man with God: hence it is written (Romans 5:10): “We are reconciled to God by the death of His Son,” in so far as Christ’s death was a most acceptable sacrifice to God, according to Ephesians 5:2: “He delivered Himself for us an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.” Now obedience is preferred to all sacrifices. according to 1 Samuel 15:22: “Obedience is better than sacrifices.” Therefore it was fitting that the sacrifice of Christ’s Passion and death should proceed from obedience. Thirdly, it was in keeping with His victory whereby He triumphed over death and its author; because a soldier cannot conquer unless he obey his captain. And so the Man-Christ secured the victory through being obedient to God, according to Proverbs 21:28: “An obedient man shall speak of victory.”

Reply to Objection 1. Christ received a command from the Father to suffer. For it is written (John 10:18): “I have power to lay down My life, and I have power to take it up again: (and) this commandment have I received of My Father”—namely, of laying down His life and of resuming it again. “From which,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. lix in Joan.), it is not to be understood “that at first He awaited the command, and that He had need to be told, but He showed the proceeding to be a voluntary one, and destroyed suspicion of opposition” to the Father. Yet because the Old Law was ended by Christ’s death, according to His dying words, “It is consummated” (John 19:30), it may be understood that by His suffering He fulfilled all the precepts of the Old Law. He fulfilled those of the moral order which are founded on the precepts of charity, inasmuch as He suffered both out of love of the Father, according to John 14:31: “That the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given Me commandment, so do I: arise, let us go hence”—namely, to the place of His Passion: and out of love of His neighbor, according to Galatians 2:20: “He loved me, and delivered Himself up for me.” Christ likewise by His Passion fulfilled the ceremonial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for sacrifices and oblations, in so far as all the ancient sacrifices were figures of that true sacrifice which the dying Christ offered for us. Hence it is written (Colossians 2:16-17): “Let no man judge you in meat or drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ’s,” for the reason that Christ is compared to them as a body is to a shadow. Christ also by His Passion fulfilled the judicial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for making compensation to them who have suffered wrong, since, as is written Psalm 68:5: He “paid that which” He “took not away,” suffering Himself to be fastened to a tree on account of the apple which man had plucked from the tree against God’s command.

Reply to Objection 2. Although obedience implies necessity with regard to the thing commanded, nevertheless it implies free-will with regard to the fulfilling of the precept. And, indeed, such was Christ’s obedience, for, although His Passion and death, considered in themselves, were repugnant to the natural will, yet Christ resolved to fulfill God’s will with respect to the same, according to Psalm 39:9: “That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it.” Hence He said (Matthew 26:42): “If this chalice may not pass away, but I must drink it, Thy will be done.”

Reply to Objection 3. For the same reason Christ suffered out of charity and out of obedience; because He fulfilled even the precepts of charity out of obedience only; and was obedient, out of love, to the Father’s command.

Article 3. Whether God the Father delivered up Christ to the Passion?

Objection 1. It would seem that God the Father did not deliver up Christ to the Passion. For it is a wicked and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and death. But, as it is written (Deuteronomy 32:4): “God is faithful, and without any iniquity.” Therefore He did not hand over the innocent Christ to His Passion and death.

Objection 2. Further, it is not likely that a man be given over to death by himself and by another also. But Christ gave Himself up for us, as it is written (Isaiah 53:12): “He hath delivered His soul unto death.” Consequently it does not appear that God the Father delivered Him up.

Objection 3. Further, Judas is held to be guilty because he betrayed Christ to the Jews, according to John 6:71: “One of you is a devil,” alluding to Judas, who was to betray Him. The Jews are likewise reviled for delivering Him up to Pilate; as we read in John 18:35: “Thy own nation, and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me.” Moreover, as is related in John 19:16: Pilate “delivered Him to them to be crucified”; and according to 2 Corinthians 6:14: there is no “participation of justice with injustice.” It seems, therefore, that God the Father did not deliver up Christ to His Passion.

On the contrary, It is written (Romans 8:32): “God hath not spared His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all.”

I answer that, As observed above (Article 2), Christ suffered voluntarily out of obedience to the Father. Hence in three respects God the Father did deliver up Christ to the Passion. In the first way, because by His eternal will He preordained Christ’s Passion for the deliverance of the human race, according to the words of Isaias (53:6): “The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all”; and again (Isaiah 53:10): “The Lord was pleased to bruise Him in infirmity.” Secondly, inasmuch as, by the infusion of charity, He inspired Him with the will to suffer for us; hence we read in the same passage: “He was offered because it was His own will” (Isaiah 53:7). Thirdly, by not shielding Him from the Passion, but abandoning Him to His persecutors: thus we read (Matthew 27:46) that Christ, while hanging upon the cross, cried out: “My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” because, to wit, He left Him to the power of His persecutors, as Augustine says (Ep. cxl).

Reply to Objection 1. It is indeed a wicked and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and to death against his will. Yet God the Father did not so deliver up Christ, but inspired Him with the will to suffer for us. God’s “severity” (cf. Romans 11:22) is thereby shown, for He would not remit sin without penalty: and the Apostle indicates this when (Romans 8:32) he says: “God spared not even His own Son.” Likewise His “goodness” (Romans 11:22) shines forth, since by no penalty endured could man pay Him enough satisfaction: and the Apostle denotes this when he says: “He delivered Him up for us all”: and, again (Romans 3:25): “Whom”—that is to say, Christ—God “hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His blood.”

Reply to Objection 2. Christ as God delivered Himself up to death by the same will and action as that by which the Father delivered Him up; but as man He gave Himself up by a will inspired of the Father. Consequently there is no contrariety in the Father delivering Him up and in Christ delivering Himself up.

Reply to Objection 3. The same act, for good or evil, is judged differently, accordingly as it proceeds from a different source. The Father delivered up Christ, and Christ surrendered Himself, from charity, and consequently we give praise to both: but Judas betrayed Christ from greed, the Jews from envy, and Pilate from worldly fear, for he stood in fear of Caesar; and these accordingly are held guilty.

Article 4. Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer at the hands of the Gentiles?

Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that Christ should suffer at the hands of the Gentiles. For since men were to be freed from sin by Christ’s death, it would seem fitting that very few should sin in His death. But the Jews sinned in His death, on whose behalf it is said (Matthew 21:38): “This is the heir; come, let us kill him.” It seems fitting, therefore, that the Gentiles should not be implicated in the sin of Christ’s slaying.

Objection 2. Further, the truth should respond to the figure. Now it was not the Gentiles but the Jews who offered the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law. Therefore neither ought Christ’s Passion, which was a true sacrifice, to be fulfilled at the hands of the Gentiles.

Objection 3. Further, as related John 5:18, “the Jews sought to kill” Christ because “He did not only break the sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God.” But these things seemed to be only against the Law of the Jews: hence they themselves said (John 19:7): “According to the Law He ought to die because He made Himself the Son of God.” It seems fitting, therefore, that Christ should suffer, at the hands not of the Gentiles, but of the Jews, and that what they said was untrue: “It is not lawful for us to put any man to death,” since many sins are punishable with death according to the Law, as is evident from Leviticus 20.

On the contrary, our Lord Himself says (Matthew 20:19): “They shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified.”

I answer that, The effect of Christ’s Passion was foreshown by the very manner of His death. For Christ’s Passion wrought its effect of salvation first of all among the Jews, very many of whom were baptized in His death, as is evident from Acts 2:41 and Acts 4:4. Afterwards, by the preaching of Jews, Christ’s Passion passed on to the Gentiles. Consequently it was fitting that Christ should begin His sufferings at the hands of the Jews, and, after they had delivered Him up, finish His Passion at the hands of the Gentiles.

Reply to Objection 1. In order to demonstrate the fulness of His love, on account of which He suffered, Christ upon the cross prayed for His persecutors. Therefore, that the fruits of His petition might accrue to Jews and Gentiles, Christ willed to suffer from both.

Reply to Objection 2. Christ’s Passion was the offering of a sacrifice, inasmuch as He endured death of His own free-will out of charity: but in so far as He suffered from His persecutors it was not a sacrifice, but a most grievous sin.

Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (Tract. cxiv in Joan.): “The Jews said that ‘it is not lawful for us to put any man to death,’ because they understood that it was not lawful for them to put any man to death” owing to the sacredness of the feast-day, which they had already begun to celebrate. or, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxiii in Joan.), because they wanted Him to be slain, not as a transgressor of the Law, but as a public enemy, since He had made Himself out to be a king, of which it was not their place to judge. Or, again, because it was not lawful for them to crucify Him (as they wanted to), but to stone Him, as they did to Stephen. Better still is it to say that the power of putting to death was taken from them by the Romans, whose subjects they were.

Article 5. Whether Christ’s persecutors knew who He was?

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ’s persecutors did know who He was. For it is written (Matthew 21:38) that the husbandmen seeing the son said within themselves: “This is the heir; come, let us kill him.” On this Jerome remarks: “Our Lord proves most manifestly by these words that the rulers of the Jews crucified the Son of God, not from ignorance, but out of envy: for they understood that it was He to whom the Father says by the Prophet: ‘Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance.'” It seems, therefore, that they knew Him to be Christ or the Son of God.

Objection 2. Further, our Lord says (John 15:24): “But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father.” Now what is seen is known manifestly. Therefore the Jews, knowing Christ, inflicted the Passion on Him out of hatred.

Objection 3. Further, it is said in a sermon delivered in the Council of Ephesus (P. iii, cap. x): “Just as he who tears up the imperial message is doomed to die, as despising the prince’s word; so the Jew, who crucified Him whom he had seen, will pay the penalty for daring to lay his hands on God the Word Himself.” Now this would not be so had they not known Him to be the Son of God, because their ignorance would have excused them. Therefore it seems that the Jews in crucifying Christ knew Him to be the Son of God.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Corinthians 2:8): “If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.” And (Acts 3:17), Peter, addressing the Jews, says: “I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers.” Likewise the Lord hanging upon the cross said: “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do” (Luke 23:34).

I answer that, Among the Jews some were elders, and others of lesser degree. Now according to the author of De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. lxvi, the elders, who were called “rulers, knew,” as did also the devils, “that He was the Christ promised in the Law: for they saw all the signs in Him which the prophets said would come to pass: but they did not know the mystery of His Godhead.” Consequently the Apostle says: “If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.” It must, however, be understood that their ignorance did not excuse them from crime, because it was, as it were, affected ignorance. For they saw manifest signs of His Godhead; yet they perverted them out of hatred and envy of Christ; neither would they believe His words, whereby He avowed that He was the Son of God. Hence He Himself says of them (John 15:22): “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin.” And afterwards He adds (John 15:24): “If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin.” And so the expression employed by Job (21:14) can be accepted on their behalf: “(Who) said to God: depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.”

But those of lesser degree—namely, the common folk—who had not grasped the mysteries of the Scriptures, did not fully comprehend that He was the Christ or the Son of God. For although some of them believed in Him, yet the multitude did not; and if they doubted sometimes whether He was the Christ, on account of the manifold signs and force of His teaching, as is stated John 7:31-41, nevertheless they were deceived afterwards by their rulers, so that they did not believe Him to be the Son of God or the Christ. Hence Peter said to them: “I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers”—namely, because they were seduced by the rulers.

Reply to Objection 1. Those words are spoken by the husbandmen of the vineyard; and these signify the rulers of the people, who knew Him to be the heir, inasmuch as they knew Him to be the Christ promised in the Law, but the words of Psalm 2:8 seem to militate against this answer: “Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance”; which are addressed to Him of whom it is said: “Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee.” If, then, they knew Him to be the one to whom the words were addressed: “Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance,” it follows that they knew Him to be the Son of God. Chrysostom, too, says upon the same passage that “they knew Him to be the Son of God.” Bede likewise, commenting on the words, “For they know not what they do” (Luke 23:34), says: “It is to be observed that He does not pray for them who, understanding Him to be the Son of God, preferred to crucify Him rather than acknowledge Him.” But to this it may be replied that they knew Him to be the Son of God, not from His Nature, but from the excellence of His singular grace.

Yet we may hold that they are said to have known also that He was verily the Son of God, in that they had evident signs thereof: yet out of hatred and envy, they refused credence to these signs, by which they might have known that He was the Son of God.

Reply to Objection 2. The words quoted are preceded by the following: “If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin“; and then follow the words: “But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father.” Now all this shows that while they beheld Christ’s marvelous works, it was owing to their hatred that they did not know Him to be the Son of God.

Reply to Objection 3. Affected ignorance does not excuse from guilt, but seems, rather, to aggravate it: for it shows that a man is so strongly attached to sin that he wishes to incur ignorance lest he avoid sinning. The Jews therefore sinned, as crucifiers not only of the Man-Christ, but also as of God.

Article 6. Whether the sin of those who crucified Christ was most grievous?

Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of Christ’s crucifiers was not the most grievous. Because the sin which has some excuse cannot be most grievous. But our Lord Himself excused the sin of His crucifiers when He said: “Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do” (Luke 23:34). Therefore theirs was not the most grievous sin.

Objection 2. Further, our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11): “He that hath delivered Me to thee hath the greater sin.” But it was Pilate who caused Christ to be crucified by his minions. Therefore the sin of Judas the traitor seems to be greater than that of those who crucified Him.

Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v): “No one suffers injustice willingly”; and in the same place he adds: “Where no one suffers injustice, nobody works injustice.” Consequently nobody wreaks injustice upon a willing subject. But Christ suffered willingly, as was shown above (Article 1,Article 2). Therefore those who crucified Christ did Him no injustice; and hence their sin was not the most grievous.

On the contrary, Chrysostom, commenting on the words, “Fill ye up, then, the measure of your fathers” (Matthew 23:32), says: “In very truth they exceeded the measure of their fathers; for these latter slew men, but they crucified God.”

I answer that, As stated above (Article 5), the rulers of the Jews knew that He was the Christ: and if there was any ignorance in them, it was affected ignorance, which could not excuse them. Therefore their sin was the most grievous, both on account of the kind of sin, as well as from the malice of their will. The Jews also of the common order sinned most grievously as to the kind of their sin: yet in one respect their crime was lessened by reason of their ignorance. Hence Bede, commenting on Luke 23:34, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,” says: “He prays for them who know not what they are doing, as having the zeal of God, but not according to knowledge.” But the sin of the Gentiles, by whose hands He was crucified, was much more excusable, since they had no knowledge of the Law.

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, the excuse made by our Lord is not to be referred to the rulers among the Jews, but to the common people.

Reply to Objection 2. Judas did not deliver up Christ to Pilate, but to the chief priests who gave Him up to Pilate, according to John 18:35: “Thy own nation and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me.” But the sin of all these was greater than that of Pilate, who slew Christ from fear of Caesar; and even greater than the sin of the soldiers who crucified Him at the governor’s bidding, not out of cupidity like Judas, nor from envy and hate like the chief priests.

Reply to Objection 3. Christ, indeed willed His Passion just as the Father willed it; yet He did not will the unjust action of the Jews. Consequently Christ’s slayers are not excused of their injustice. Nevertheless, whoever slays a man not only does a wrong to the one slain, but likewise to God and to the State; just as he who kills himself, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v). Hence it was that David condemned to death the man who “did not fear to lay hands upon the Lord’s anointed,” even though he (Saul) had requested it, as related in 2 Samuel 1:5-14.

Source. New Advent – The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, 1920, Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight.

Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo

QUESTION II — On Sins

Article 5 — Are Some Acts Morally Indifferent?

Those who strive contrary to the will of God fulfill his very will apart from their intention, as, for example the Jews who put Jesus to death fulfilled the will of God regarding the redemption of the human race apart from their intention. And fulfilling the will of God in this way is neither good nor praiseworthy.

QUESTION III — On the Causes of Sin

Article 15 — Can Sins against the Holy Spirit Be Forgiven?

But Chrysostom explains himself more facilely by referring to the fact that the Jews were to suffer punishment for the blasphemies they brought against Christ, both in this life from the Romans and in the next in the damnation of hell.

QUESTION IV — On Original Sin

Article 8 — Are the Sins of Immediate Parents Transmitted by Physical Descent to Their Posterity?

According to Mt 27:25, the Jews said: “His blood be upon us and our children.” And explaining this, Augustine in a sermon on the Lord’s passion says: “Behold what goods they transmit to their heirs by such a testimonial to their sacrilege; they imbue themselves with the stain of his blood, and they ruin their posterity.”

Reply to the Objections

The descendants of the Jews are liable for the blood of Christ insofar as the descendants imitate the wickedness of their ancestors by approving it.

QUESTION XIII — On Avarice

Article 4 — Is Lending at Interest a Mortal Sin?

The divine law allowed the Jews to take money as interest from foreigners as something tolerated but not licit… And the reason for this was that the Jews were prone to avarice. And so the lesser evil, namely, taking interest from Gentiles, was permitted to the Jews in order to avoid a greater evil, namely, taking interest from Jews, who worship God.

Source. Isidore – St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo. Translated by Richard Regan, Oxford University Press, 2003.

Commentary on Matthew, Chapter 23, Lecture 2, Paragraph 1861

1861. Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte. And this is explained in two ways, according as it is referred to the time after Christ or to the time before Christ.

If to the time after, in this way he speaks of future things as present things. For he foresaw that the Jews would be scattered through the whole world, and that they would convert others to their law, and would turn aside from Christ those whom they could. And for this reason it says, you go round about the sea and the land. Those are called proselytes who are converted to their faith from the gentiles or from Christians; and since he foresaw that they would convert some from Christians to their own faith, he says this. And he says, one, because only a very few were converted. So they enter that curse which is found in Hosea, I found Israel like grapes in the desert (Hos 9:10). And when he is made a Jew you make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves: for he is first a gentile and then a Jew, and then he has a double sin, namely that of the gentiles and that of the Jews, for since he is a Jew, he becomes a partaker in the killing of Christ; but if he is a Christian and then a Jew, he is made worse twice over, for he dishonors the gift of the Holy Spirit, which he had received in the sacraments. Likewise, he becomes a partaker in the sins of the Jews; you are of your father the devil (John 8:44).

Source. Aquinas.cc – Commentary on Matthew, Chapter 23, Lecture 2, Paragraph 1861

Commentary on Matthew, Chapter 27, Lecture 1, Paragraph 2337-2343

2337. Then he sets down the effort of the Jews, who wished to kill Christ: but the chief priests and elders persuaded the people, that they should ask for Barabbas. For in either they show themselves to be detestable, for the chief priests are those who should correct others; he who justifies the wicked, and he who condemns the just, both are abominable before God (Prov 17:15). Similarly, by the fact that the elders did so; iniquity came . . . from the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people (Dan 13:5).

2338. And the governor answering, said to them. Here he sets down the attempt with which Pilate attempted to release him. And first, he describes the words by which he acted for the release; second, the deeds, at and Pilate seeing that nothing prevailed.Tribus modis est conatus liberare eum. Primo ex comparatione; secundo ex dignitate; tertio ex innocentia.He tried to free him in three ways: first, by a comparison; second, by Christ’s dignity; third, by his innocence.

2339. By a comparison, because he compared him to an evildoer, answering namely to the people’s request, or to the leaders who prompted him, which of the two do you wish to be released to you? But they said, Barabbas. For which Peter rebuked the people also, saying about Christ: whom you indeed delivered up and denied before the face of Pilate, when he judged he should be released. But you denied the Holy One and the Just, and desired a murderer to be granted unto you (Acts 3:13–14).

2340. Therefore, Pilate said: what should I do then with Jesus who is called the Christ? Here he appeals to his dignity: what should I do then with Jesus, as though to say: it will be harmful to you if you kill the one who is called the Christ. But these men were incapable of reverence; rather they all say, let him be crucified, for this was a most shameful death. So what is said is fulfilled, let us condemn him to a most shameful death (Wis 2:20); their tongue, and their devices are against the Lord (Isa 3:8).

2341. The governor said to them: why, what evil has he done? Here he appeals to his innocence, meaning to free him, as though using what is said, what iniquity have your fathers found in me? (Jer 2:5). And, which of you will convince me of sin? (John 8:46). But they cried out the more, saying: let him be crucified. Hence they could not be persuaded, in accord with, they have laid hold on lying, and have refused to return (Jer 8:5). Hence they were obstinate in malice.

2342. And Pilate seeing that nothing prevailed. Here he aims at his liberation by deed: and first, the deed is set down; second, the people’s agreement to the punishment.

He says, and Pilate seeing that nothing prevailed. By this he gives one to understand that he had said many other things, and that it did no good. Taking water washed his hands. This was the custom, that when someone wanted to show himself innocent, he would wash his hands, as this man did; hence he said, I am innocent of the blood of this just man. In accord with this manner of acting, it says, I will wash my hands among the innocent (Ps 25:6). And truly, he would have been innocent if he had persevered in his judgment, hence he calls him a just man. You look to it, i.e., what should happen to you. Hence John says, take him, and judge him according to your law (John 18:31).

.2343. Then there follows the agreement to the punishment: his blood be upon us and our children. And in this way it came about that Christ’s blood is demanded of them even to this day; and what is said fits them well: the voice of your brother’s blood cries to me from the earth (Gen 4:10). But Christ’s blood is more efficacious than Abel’s blood. The Apostle: and to the sprinkling of blood which speaks better than that of Abel (Heb 12:24); if you put me to death, you will shed innocent blood against your own selves (Jer 26:15).

Source. Aquinas.cc – Commentary on Matthew, Chapter 27, Lecture 1, Paragraph 2337-2343

Commentary on John, Chapter 5, Lecture 7, Paragraph 829-837

829. Then, at I have come in the name of my Father, and you do not receive me, he gives a sign that they do not love God; second, a future sign, at if another shall come in his own name, you will receive him.

830. The present sign concerns his own coming; so he says, I have come in the name of my Father. As if to say: what I say is obvious, for if one loves his Lord, it is clear that he will honor and receive one who comes from him, and seek to honor him. But I have come in the name of my Father, and I make his name known to the world: I have manifested your name to the men whom you have given me (John 17:6), and yet you do not accept me. Therefore, you do not love him.

The Son is said to make his Father known to men because, although the Father, as God, was known—God is known in Judah (Ps 75:1)—yet he was not known as the natural Father of the Son before Christ came. Thus Solomon asked: what is his name? And what is the name of his son? (Prov 30:4).

831. The future sign concerns the coming of the Antichrist. For the Jew
s could say: although you come in his name, we have not accepted you, because we will not accept anyone but God the Father. The Lord speaks against this, and says that it cannot be, because you will accept another, who will come, not in the Father’s name, but in his own name; and what is more, he will come, not in the name of the Father, but in his own name, precisely because he will not seek the glory of the Father but his own. And whatever he does, he will attribute it, not to the Father, but to himself: who opposes and is exalted above all that is called God, or is worshipped (2 Thess 2:4). You will receive him; and so the Apostle continues in the same letter: God will send them a misleading influence so that they might believe what is false (2 Thess 2:11). And this, because they did not accept the true teaching, that they might be saved. So the Gloss says: because the Jews were unwilling to accept Christ, the penalty for this sin will be, fittingly enough, that they will receive the Antichrist; with the result that those who were unwilling to believe the truth, will believe a lie.

According to Augustine, however, we can understand this text as applying to heretics and false teachers: who spread a teaching that comes from their own hearts and not from the mouth of God, and who praise themselves and despise the name of God. Of such persons it is written: you have heard that the Antichrist is coming; and now many Antichrists have appeared (1 John 2:18). So it is clear that your persecution of me does not spring from your love for God, but from your hatred and envy of him. And this was the reason why they did not believe.

832. He concludes: how are you able to believe, who receive glory from one another, i.e., human praise, and the glory that is from God alone, you do not seek? which is true glory. The reason they could not believe in Christ was that, since their proud minds were craving their own glory and praise, they considered themselves superior to others in glory, and regarded it as a disgrace to believe in Christ, who seemed common and poor. And this was why they could not believe in him. The one who can believe in Christ is the person of humble heart, who seeks the glory of God alone, and who strives to please him. And so we read: many of the chief men also believed in him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, that they might not be cast out of the synagogue (John 12:42).

We can see from this just how dangerous vainglory is. For this reason Cicero says: let a man beware of that glory that robs him of all freedom; that freedom for which a man of great spirit should risk everything. And the Gloss says: it is a great vice to boast and to strive for human praise: to desire that others think you have what you really do not have.

833. Then, at do not think that I will accuse you, he shows that they do not have zeal for Moses. First, how Moses was against them. Second, he gives the reason for this opposition, at if you believed Moses, you would perhaps believe me also. As to the first he does two things. First, he rejects their false zeal; second, he shows them true zeal, at there is one who accuses you, Moses.

834. As to the first he says: do not think that I will accuse you to the Father.

There are three reasons for his saying this. First, the Son of God did not come into the world to condemn the world, but to save it. So he says, do not think that I have come to condemn, I have come to free: for God did not send his Son into the world to judge the world, that is, to condemn the world, but that the world might be saved through him (John 3:17). And so the blood of Christ cries out, not to accuse, but to forgive: we have the blood of Christ, crying out better than that of Abel (Heb 12:24), whose blood cried out to accuse; who will accuse God’s elect? It is Christ who justifies. Who is it, then, who will condemn? (Rom 8:33).

As to his second reason for saying this, he says: do not think that I will accuse you to the Father, because I will not be the one to accuse you, but to judge you: the Father has given all judgment to the Son (John 5:22).

The third reason is: do not think that I, i.e., I alone, will accuse you to the Father for what you are doing to me; for even Moses will accuse you for not believing him in the things he said of me.

835. Consequently he adds: there is one who accuses you, Moses, in whom you trust, because you believe you are saved through his precepts.

Moses accuses them in two ways. Materially, because they deserved to be accused for transgressing his commands: those who have sinned under the law, will be judged by the law (Rom 2:12). Again, Moses accuses them because he and the other saints will have authority in the judgment: the two-edged swords will be in their hands (Ps 149:6).

836. He presents the reason for this opposition when he says: if you believed Moses, you would perhaps believe me also, as is clear from the Lord your God will raise up a prophet for you, from your nation and your brothers; he will be like me: you will listen to him (Deut 18:15), and from all the sacrifices, which were a symbol of Christ.

He says, perhaps, to indicate that their will acts from a free judgment, and not to imply that there is any doubt on the part of God.

837. Then when he says, but if you do not believe his writings, how will you believe my words? he gives a sign of this opposition. He does this by comparing two things, and then denying of the lesser of them what is denied of the greater. First, there is a comparison between Moses and Christ: for although Christ, absolutely speaking, is greater than Moses, Moses was the greater in reputation among the Jews. Thus he says: if you do not believe Moses, you will not believe me either.

Second, he compares the way in which they presented their teaching: Moses gave his precepts in a written form; and so they can be studied for a long time, and are not easily forgotten. Hence they impose a stronger obligation to believe. But Christ presented his teachings in spoken words. Thus he says, but if you do not believe his writings, which you have preserved in your books, how will you believe my words?

Source. Aquinas.cc – Commentary on John, Chapter 5, Lecture 7, Paragraph 829-837

Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 8

John 8:37-47 – The Jews as Children of the Devil

Lecture 5, n. 1218-1230

After showing that the Jews had a certain spiritual origin, our Lord here rejects certain origins which they had presumptuously attributed to themselves. First, he rejects the origin they claimed to have from Abraham; second, the origin they thought they had from God, at they said therefore to him: we were not born of fornication. As to the first he does two things: first, he gives the opinion of the Jews about their origin; second, he rejects it, at if you are the sons of Abraham, do the works of Abraham.

It should be noted with respect to the first, that our Lord had said to them, you do the things that you have seen with your father (John 8:38), and so, glorying in their carnal descent, they aligned themselves with Abraham. Thus they said, Abraham is our father. This is like saying: if we have a spiritual origin we are good, because our father Abraham is good: O offspring of Abraham his servant (Ps 105:6). And as Augustine says, they tried to provoke him to say something against Abraham and so give them an excuse for doing what they had planned, namely, to kill Christ.

Our Lord rejects this opinion of theirs as false, at if you are the sons of Abraham, do the works of Abraham. First, he gives the true sign of being a child of Abraham; second, he shows that this sign is not verified in the Jews, at but now you seek to kill me; third, he draws his conclusion, you do the works of your father. The sign of anyone being a child is that he is like the one whose child he is; for just as children according to the flesh resemble their parents according to the flesh, so spiritual children (if they are truly children) should imitate their spiritual parents: be imitators of God, as beloved children (Eph 5:1). And as to this he says, if you are the sons of Abraham, do the works of Abraham. This is like saying: if you imitated Abraham, that would be a sign that you are his children: look to Abraham your father and to Sarah who bore you (Isa 51:2).

Here a question arises, for when he says, if you are the sons of Abraham, he seems to be denying that they are the children of Abraham, whereas just previously he had said, I know that you are the sons of Abraham (John 8:37). There are two ways of answering this. The first, according to Augustine, is that before he said that they were children of Abraham according to the flesh, but here he is denying that they are children in the sense of imitating his works, especially his faith. Therefore, they took their flesh from him, but not their life: it is men of faith who are the sons of Abraham (Gal 3:7). For Origin, who has another explanation, both statements refer to their spiritual origin. Where our text reads, I know that you are the sons of Abraham, the Greek has, I know that you are the seed of Abraham (John 8:37). But Christ says here, if you are the sons of Abraham, do the works of Abraham, because the Jews, spiritually speaking, were the seed of Abraham, but were not his children. There is a difference between a seed and a child: for a seed is unformed, although it has in it the characteristics of that of which it is a seed. A child, however, has a likeness to the parent after the seed has been modified by the informing power infused by the agent acting upon the matter which has been furnished by the female. In the same way, the Jews were indeed the seed of Abraham, insofar as they had some of the characteristics which God had infused into Abraham; but because they had not reached the perfection of Abraham, they were not his children. This is why he said to them, if you are the sons of Abraham, do the works of Abraham, i.e., strive for a perfect imitation of his works.

Again, because he said, do the works of Abraham, it would seem that whatever he did, we should do. Consequently, we should have a number of wives and approach a maidservant, as Abraham did. I answer that the chief work of Abraham was faith, by which he was justified before God: he believed the Lord; and he reckoned it to him as righteousness (Gen 15:6). Thus, the meaning is, do the works of Abraham i.e., believe according to the example of Abraham. One might say against this interpretation that faith should not be called a work, since it is distinguished from works: faith apart from works is dead (Jas 2:26) I answer that faith can be called a work according to what was said above: this is the work of God: that you believe in him whom he has sent (John 6:29). An interior work is not obvious to man, but only to God, according to, the Lord sees not as man sees; man looks on the outward appearance, but the Lord looks on the heart (1 Sam 16:7). This is the reason we are more accustomed to call exterior action works. Thus, faith is not distinguished from all works, but only from external works.

But should we do all the works of Abraham? I answer that works can be considered in two ways. Either according to the kind of works they are, in which sense we should not imitate all his works; or, according to their root, and in this sense we should imitate the works of Abraham, because whatever he did, he did out of charity. Thus Augustine says that the celibacy of John was not esteemed above the marriage of Abraham, since the root of each was the same. Or, it might be said that all of Abraham’s works should be imitated as to their symbolism, because all these things happen to them in figure (1 Cor 10:11).

Then, at but now you seek to kill me, he shows that they do not have the above mentioned sign of being children. First, the conduct of the Jews is given; second, he shows that it does not resemble the conduct of Abraham, at Abraham did not do this. The conduct of the Jews is shown to be wicked and perverse, because they were murderers; so he says, now you seek to kill me: how the faithful city has become a harlot, she that was full of justice! Righteousness lodged in her, but now murderers (Isa 1:21). This murder was an unfathomable sin against the person of the Son of God. But because it is said, if they had understood, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory (1 Cor 2:8), our Lord does not say that they sought to kill the Son of God, but a man. For although the Son of God is said to have suffered and died by reason of the oneness of his person, this suffering and death was not insofar as he was the Son of God, but because of his human weakness, as it says: for he was crucified in weakness, but lives by the power of God (2 Cor 13:4).

In order to further elucidate this murder, he shows that they have no reason to put him to death; thus he adds, a man who has spoken the truth to you, which I have heard from God. This truth is that he said that he is equal to God: therefore, the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he did not only break the Sabbath, but also said that God was his Father, making himself equal to God (John 5:18). He heard this truth from God inasmuch as from eternity he received from the Father, through an eternal generation, the same nature that the Father has: for as the Father has life in himself, so he has also given to the Son to have life in himself (John 5:26). Furthermore, he excludes the two reasons for which the law commanded that prophets were to be killed. First of all, for lying, for Deuteronomy commands that a prophet should be killed for speaking a lie or feigning dreams (Deut 13:5). Our Lord excludes this from himself, saying, a man who has spoken the truth to you: my mouth will utter truth (Prov 8:7). Second, a prophet ought to be killed if he speaks in the name of false gods, or says in the name of God things that God did not command (Deut 13:5). Our Lord excludes this from himself when he says, which I have heard from God.

Then when he says, Abraham did not do this, he shows that their works are not like those of Abraham. He is saying in effect: because you act contrary to Abraham, you show that you are not his children, for it is written about him: he kept the law of the Most High, and was taken into covenant with him (Sir 44:20). Some frivolously object that Christ did not exist before Abraham and therefore that Abraham did not do this, since one who did not exist could not be killed. I answer that Abraham is not commended for something he did not do to Christ, but for what he did not do to anyone in like circumstances, i.e., to those who spoke the truth in his day. Or, it might be answered that although Christ had not come in the flesh during the time of Abraham, he nevertheless had come into his mind, according to: in every generation she passes into souls (Wis 7:27). And Abraham did not kill wisdom by sinning mortally. Concerning this we read: they crucify the Son of God (Heb 6:6). Then when he says, you do the works of your father, he draws his conclusion. It was like saying: from the fact that you do not do the works of Abraham, it follows that you have some other father whose works you are doing. A similar statement is made: fill up, then, the measure of your fathers (Matt 23:32)

Lecture 5, n. 1231-1238

Then when he says, they said to him: we were not born of fornication, he shows that they do not take their origin from God, for since they knew from our Lord’s words that he was not speaking of carnal descent, they turn to spiritual descent, saying, we were not born of fornication, saying, we were not born of fornication. First, they give their own opinion; second, our Lord rejects it, at Jesus therefore said to them: if God were your Father.

According to some, the Jews are denying one thing and affirming another. They are denying that they were born of fornication. According to Origin, they said this tauntingly to Christ, with the unspoken suggestion that he was the product of adultery. It was like saying: we were not born of fornication as you were. But it is better to say that the spiritual spouse of the soul is God: I will betroth you to me forever (Hos 2:19), and just as a bride is guilty of fornication when she admits a man other than her husband, so in Scripture Judea was said to be fornicating when she abandoned the true God and turned to idols: for the land commits great harlotry by forsaking the Lord (Hos 1:2). And so the Jews said: we were not born of fornication. It was like saying: although our mother, the synagogue, may now and then have departed from God and fornicated with idols, yet we have not departed or fornicated with idols: we have not forgotten thee, or been false to thy covenant. Our heart has not turned back (Ps 44:17); but you, draw near hither, sons of the sorceress, offspring of the adulterer and the harlot (Isa 57:3). Further, they affirm that they are children of God; and this seems to follow from the fact that they did not believe that they were born of fornication. Thus they say, we have one God, the Father: have we not all one father? (Mal 2:10); and I thought you would call me, my Father (Jer 3:19).

Next, at Jesus therefore said to them: if God were your Father, our Lord refutes their opinion: first we see the sign of being a child of God; second, the reason for this sign is given, at for I proceeded and came forth from God; and third, we see that the Jews lack this sign, at why do you not know my speech? With respect to the first it should be noted that above he had said that the sign of being a child according to the flesh was in the exterior actions that a person performs; but here he places the sign of being a child of God in one’s interior affections. For we become children of God by sharing in the Holy Spirit: you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received the spirit of sonship (Rom 8:15). Now the Holy Spirit is the cause of our loving God, because God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us (Rom 5:5). Therefore, the special sign of being a child of God is love: be imitators of God, as beloved children. And walk in love (Eph 5:1). Therefore he says, if God were your Father, you would indeed love me: the innocent and the right in heart, who are the children of God, have clung to me (Ps 21:4).

Then, at for I proceeded and came forth from God, he gives the reason for this sign. First, he states the truth; second, he rejects an error, at for I came not of myself. The truth he asserts is that he proceeded and came forth from God. It should be noted that all friendship is based on union, and so brothers love one another inasmuch as they take their origin from the same parents. Thus our Lord says: you say that you are the children of God; but if this were so, you would indeed love me, for I proceeded and came forth from God. Therefore, any one who does not love me is not a child of God. I say I proceeded from God from eternity as the Only Begotten, of the substance of the Father: from the womb before the daystar I begot you (Ps 109:4); in the beginning was the Word (John 1:1). And I came forth as the Word who was made flesh, sent by God through incarnation. I came forth from the Father, from eternity, as the Word, and have come into the world when I was made flesh in time (John 16:28).

He rejects an error when he says, I came not of myself. And first, he rejects the error of Sabellius, who said that Christ did not have his origin from another, for he said that the Father and the Son were the same in person. In regard to this he says, I came not of myself, i.e., according to Hilary, I came, not existing of myself, but in a way as sent by another, that is, the Father. Thus he adds, but he sent me: God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law (Gal 4:4). Second, he rejects an error of the Jews who said that Christ was not sent by God, but was a false prophet, of whom we read: I did not send the prophets, yet they ran (Jer 23:21). And in regard to this he says, according to Origen, I came not of myself, but he sent me. Indeed, this is what Moses prayed for: I beseech thee, Lord send whom thou wilt send (Exod 4:13).

He shows that they lack this sign when he says, why do you not know my speech? For as was stated above, to love Christ is the sign of being a child of God; but they did not love Christ; therefore it is obvious that they did not have this sign. That they do not love Christ is shown by the effect of love: for the effect of loving someone is that the lover joyfully hears the words of the beloved; thus we read: let me hear your voice, for your voice is sweet (Song 2:14). And again, my companions are listening for your voice; let me hear it (Song 8:13). Therefore, because they did not love Christ, it seemed tedious to them even to hear his voice: this saying is hard, and who is able to accept it? (John 6:61); the very sight of him is a burden to us (Wis 2:15). It sometimes happens that a person is not glad to hear the words of another because he cannot weigh them and for that reason does not understand them, and so he contradicts them: answer, I beseech you, without contention . . . and you shall not find iniquity on my tongue (Job 6:29). Therefore he says, why do you not know my speech? For you asked earlier, what is this that he said, where I go, you cannot come? (John 8:21). I say that you do not understand because you cannot bear to hear my word, i.e., your heart is so hardened against me that you do not even want to hear me.

Lecture 6, n. 1239-1242

After showing that the Jews had a certain spiritual origin, and after rejecting the origin they presumed they had, our Lord here gives their true origin, ascribing their fatherhood to the devil. First, he makes his statement; second, he gives its reason; at and you will do the desires of your father; third, he explains this reason, at he was a murderer from the beginning.

He says: you are of your father the devil, and you will do the desires of your father, that is, by imitating him: your father was an Amorite, and your mother a Hittite (Ezek 16:3). Here one must guard against the heresy of the Manicheans who claim that there is a definite nature called ‘evil,’ and a certain race of darkness with its own princes, from which all corruptible things derive their origin. According to this opinion, all men, as to their flesh, have come from the devil. Further, they say that certain souls belong to that creation which is good, and others to that which is evil. Thus they said that our Lord said, you are of your father the devil, because they came from the devil according to the flesh, and their souls were part of that creation which was evil. But as Origen says, to suppose that there are two natures because of the difference between good and evil seems to be like saying that the substance of an eye which sees is different from that of an eye that is clouded or crossed. For just as a healthy and bleary eye do not differ in substance, but the bleariness is from some deficient cause, so the substance and nature of a thing is the same whether it is good or has a defect in itself, which is a sin of the will. And so the Jews, as evil, are not called the children of the devil by nature, but by reason of their imitating him.

Then when he says, and you will do the desires of your father, he gives the reason for this, for their being of the devil. It is like saying: you are not the children of the devil as though created and brought into existence by him, but because by imitating him you will do the desires of your father. And these desires are evil, for as he envied and killed man—through the devil’s envy death entered the world (Wis 2:24)—so you too envy me and but now you seek to kill me, a man who has spoken the truth to you (John 8:40). Then when he says, he was a murderer from the beginning, he explains the reason he gave. First, he mentions the characteristic of the devil that they imitate; second, he shows that they are truly imitators of that, at but if I say the truth, you do not believe me (John 8:45). With respect to the first it should be noted that two sins stand out in the devil: the sin of pride towards God, and of envy towards man, whom he destroys. And from the sin of envy towards man, because of which he injures him, we can know his sin of pride. And so first, he mentions the devil’s sin against man; second, his sin against God, he did not stand in the truth.

Lecture 7, n. 1253, 1263-1264

After mentioning some characteristics of the devil, he then shows that the Jews are imitating these. Our Lord ascribed two kinds of evil to the devil, murder and lying. He reproved them before for their imitation of one of these, namely, murder: but now you seek to kill me, a man who has spoken the truth to you, which I heard from God (John 8:40). Then passing from this, he reproves them for turning away from the truth.

Then when he says, Jesus answered: I do not have a demon, our Lord rejects the response of the Jews. Now they had taxed Christ with two things, that he was a Samaritan and that he had a demon. Concerning the first, our Lord makes no apology, and this for two reasons. First, according to Origen, because the Jews always wanted to keep themselves apart from the gentiles. But the time had now come when the distinction between Jews and gentiles was to be removed, and everyone was to be called to the way of salvation. Accordingly, our Lord, in order to show that he had come for the salvation of all, made himself all things to all men, more so than Paul, so that he might win all (1 Cor 9:22); and so he did not deny that he was a Samaritan. The other reason was that Samaritan means keeper, and because he especially is our keeper, as we read, he who keeps Israel will neither slumber nor sleep (Ps 121:4), so he did not deny that he was a Samaritan.

It should be noted with respect to the first that when correcting the Jews our Lord often spoke harshly to them: woe to you, Scribes and Pharisees (Matt 23:14), and many other instances are recorded in the Gospels. But there is no record that our Lord spoke harsh or injurious words in answer to their harsh words or deeds against himself. Rather, as Gregory said, God accepted their insults, and did not answer with insulting words, but simply said, I do not have a demon. And what does this suggests to us if not that when we are falsely attacked by our neighbor with railing words, we should keep silence, even about his abusive words, so as not to pervert our ministry of correcting in a just manner into a weapon of our anger. However, while we should not value our own goods, we should vindicate the things that are of God.

Source. Aquinas.cc – Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 8

Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Chapters 9-11

Romans 9:1-5 – Paul’s Love for the Jews

Lecture 1, n. 735-747

Having shown the need and power of grace, the Apostle begins to discuss the origin of grace and ask whether it is conferred solely by God’s choice or from the merits of previous works. He raises this question because the Jews, seemingly called to God’s special protection, had fallen from grace; whereas the gentiles, previously alienated from God, had been admitted to it. First, therefore, he discusses the election of the gentiles; second, the fall of the Jews, at brethren, the will of my heart (Rom 10:1).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he recounts the greatness of the Jews; second, he shows how the gentiles have been drawn into that greatness, at not as though the word of God has failed (Rom 9:6). First, the Apostle shows his affection for the Jewish people, lest anything he had said or was about to say against them should seem to proceed from hatred; second, he shows their dignity, at who are Israelites.

First, he confirms what he was about to say; second, he demonstrates his affection, at that I have great sadness. First, he confirms what he is about to say with a simple assertion, I speak the truth, which especially befits the preacher who is a witness to the truth: my mouth will utter truth (Prov 8:7); love truth and peace (Zech 8:19). And because a person sometimes mixes falsehood with the truth, he excludes this when he adds, I am not lying: putting away falsehood, let everyone speak the truth to his neighbor (Eph 4:25).

Second, he confirms what he is about to say with an oath, which is a confirmation supported by the testimony of infallible truth. Such are the witnesses of the saints. First, God himself, as it says in Job: my witness is in heaven (Job 16:19). Hence Paul says, in Christ, i.e., through Jesus Christ who is the truth without falsehood: the Son of God whom we preached among you was not yes and no (2 Cor 1:19). Second, the infallible witness of the saints is their conscience; hence he adds: my conscience bearing me witness: our boast is this, the testimony of our conscience (2 Cor 1:12). But because one’s conscience is sometimes erroneous unless it is corrected by the Holy Spirit, he adds: in the Holy Spirit: the Spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit (Rom 8:16).

Then he shows his affection for the Jews by the pain he suffered from their fall, when he says, that I have great sadness. First, he describes this pain; second, he mentions a sign of it, when he says, for I wished myself. He emphasizes how much pain he has suffered in three ways. First by its magnitude: that I have great sadness, because it concerns a great evil, namely, the exclusion of such a great people: vast as the sea is your ruin (Lam 2:13). Second, he emphasizes his grief by its duration, when he says, and continual sorrow; not that he never ceased to grieve actually, but habitually: that I might weep day and night for the slain of my people (Jer 9:1). Third, he emphasizes how real it was when he says, in my heart; for it was not superficial but rooted in the heart: my eyes are spent in weeping and my heart is poured out in grief (Lam 2:11).

Then he presents the sign of his sadness, saying, for I, who am so fervent in the love of Christ, as was shown above, wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren. The cause of this attitude is shown when he says: for my brethren. Hence Sirach says: three things are approved before God and men: the concord of brethren, the love of neighbors, and a wife and husband who live in harmony (Sir 25:1). Then to show that he was not referring to those who were his spiritual brethren in Christ, he adds: and all you are brethren, adding who are my kinsmen according to the flesh: are they descendants of Abraham? So am I (2 Cor 11:22).

Then, when he says who are Israelites, he shows the greatness of the Jews in order that his sadness appear reasonable on account of the ancient dignity of a deteriorating people, for it is a weightier evil to lose greatness than never to have possessed it, as the Gloss says, and not as though it arose solely from worldly love. But he shows their greatness in three ways.

First, from their race when he says, who are Israelites, i.e., descending from the stock of Jacob who was called Israel (Gen 32:28). This pertains to their greatness, for it is said: neither is there any nation so great as to have their gods coming to them (Deut 4:7).

Second, he shows the greatness of that race from God’s blessings: first, the spiritual blessings, one of which refers to the present: to whom belongs the adoption of sons of God. Hence it says in Exodus: Israel is my son, my firstborn (Exod 4:22). This refers to the spiritual men who arose among that people: but as to worldly men he stated above that they received the spirit of slavery in fear (Rom 8:15). Another spiritual blessing refers to the future when he says, the glory, namely, of the sons of God promised to them. A reference to this is found in Exodus: the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle (Exod 40:32).

Then he sets out other, figural benefits, of which three are figures of present spiritual benefit. The first of these is the testament, i.e., the pact of circumcision given to Abraham, as is recorded in Genesis 17, although this could be referred to the new covenant preached first to the Jews. Hence, the Lord himself said: I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel (Matt 15:24); and Jeremiah: I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel (Jer 31:31). The second is the law given through Moses; hence, he continues: the giving of the law: Moses commanded a law to us (Sir 24:33). The third is divine worship when he says: the service with which they served God, when all the other nations were serving idols: but now hear, O Jacob my servant, Israel whom I have chosen (Isa 44:1).

Then he mentions the blessing which pertains to future glory when he says: and the promises. For the promises made in the Old Testament and fulfilled by Christ seem made especially to the Jews; hence he says below: I tell you that Christ became a servant to the circumcised to confirm the promises made to the patriarchs (Rom 15:8). Now many other promises were made to them about earthly goods, as is recorded in Leviticus 26 and Deuteronomy 18, but by these temporal goods spiritual things were prefigured.

Third, he describes the Jews‘ dignity by their origin, when he says, whose fathers, because they were begotten according to the flesh by those ancestors who were especially acceptable to God: I love your fathers and chose their descendants after them (Deut 4:37); like the first fruit on the fig tree I saw their fathers (Hos 9:1).

Fourth, he shows their greatness from a descendant when he says, and of whom is Christ, according to the flesh who says: salvation is from the Jews (John 4:22). Then to prevent this from being underestimated he shows the greatness of Christ, saying: who is over all things, God blessed forever. Amen: this is the true God and eternal life (1 John 5:20).

In these words four heresies are refuted: first, Manichean, which held that Christ had not a true but imaginary body. This is refuted when he says, according to the flesh. For he has true flesh, as it says in Luke: a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see that I have (Luke 24:39). Second, Valentinus’ heresy which claims that Christ’s body was not taken from the human line but brought from heaven. This is excluded when he says that Christ was from the Jews according to the flesh, in keeping with Matthew: the book of the genealogy of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham (Matt 1:1). Third, the heresy of Nestorius according to whom the Son of man was other than the Son of God. Against this the Apostle says here that whose fathers and of whom is Christ, according to the flesh, who is over all things, God. Fourth, the Arian heresy, which claimed that Christ was less than the Father and created from nothing. Against the first he says that he is over all things; against the second that he is blessed forever. For it is true of God alone that his goodness remains forever.

Romans 9:6-13 – The Sons of the Promise

Lecture 2, n. 748-764

After asserting the greatness of the Jews, the Apostle now shows that it did not refer to those who descended according to the flesh from the ancient patriarchs but to the spiritual progeny chosen by God. First, he shows that this greatness arises from God’s selection; second, that this selection applies generally to Jew and gentiles, at even us, whom also he has called (Rom 9:24).

In regard to the first he does two things: first, he shows how from God’s choice men obtain spiritual greatness; second, he raises a question about the justice of God’s choice, at what shall we say then? (Rom 9:14). In regard to the first he does two things: First, he states his proposition; second, shows it, at but in Isaac. Concerning the first, he does two things. First he sets out the firmness of the divine election; second, he shows in whom it is accomplished, at for all are not Israelites.

First, therefore, he says: It has been stated that the promises, the adoption of sons, and glory referred to people whose fall is to me a source of great sadness and unceasing sorrow. But it is not as though the word of God has failed, i.e., was frustrated, because although it has found no place in those who had fallen, it has a place in others: the word that goes forth from my mouth shall not return to me empty, but it shall accomplish that which I purpose (Isa 55:11); forever, O Lord, your word is firmly fixed (Ps 119:89).

Then he shows how and in whom God’s word has failed, when he says for all are not Israelites. In regard to this it should be noted that the Jews boasted mainly of two things, namely, Abraham, who first received the pact of circumcision from God (Gen 17) and Jacob or Israel, all of whose descendants were counted as God’s people. This was not true of Isaac, for the descendants of his son Esau did not belong to God’s people.

Hence the Apostle states his proposition: first, by a comparison with Jacob: for all are not Israelites who are of Israel, i.e., from Jacob according to the flesh, are true Israelites, to whom God’s promises belong, but those who are upright and see God by faith: fear not, Jacob, and thus most just whom I have chosen (Isa 44:2). Hence the Lord also said to Nathanael: behold, an Israelite indeed, in whom there is no guile (John 1:47). Now this name, Israel, had been put on Jacob by an angel (Gen 32:28). Second, he states the same things by comparison with Abraham, saying: neither are all they who are the seed of Abraham, sons, i.e., are not the spiritual sons of Abraham to whom God promised the blessings, but only those who imitate his faith and works: if you were Abraham’s children, you would do what Abraham did (John 8:40).

Then he clarifies his statement, at but in Isaac. First, in regard to Abraham; second, in regard to Jacob, at and not only she. In regard to the first he does three things: first, he cites a text from Scripture, saying, but in Isaac will your seed be called. This the Lord said to Abraham, as it says in Genesis 21, when describing the expulsion of Ishmael. As if to say: not all who were born from Abraham according to the flesh belong to that seed to whom the promises were made, as it says in Galatains: to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed (Gal 3:16), but those who are like Isaac.

Then he explains the quoted text so far as it applies to his thesis, when he says that is to say, not they who are the sons. To understand this it should be noted that the Apostle says in Galatians: Abraham had two sons, one by a slave and one by a free woman. But the son of the slave, namely, Ishmael, was born according to the flesh (Gal 4:22), because he was born according to the law and custom of the flesh from a young woman: the son of the free woman, namely, Isaac, through promise and not according to the flesh, i.e., not according to the law and custom of the flesh, because he was born from a sterile, old woman (Gen 18:10); although he was born according to the flesh, i.e., according to the substance of the flesh he received from his parents.

From this the Apostle decides that those adopted into the sonship of God are not the sons of the flesh, i.e., not because they are the bodily descendants of Abraham, but they are accounted for the seed, to whom was made the promise, who are the sons of the promise, i.e., those who are made sons of Abraham because they imitate his faith, as it says in Matthew: God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham (Matt 3:9). Thus, Ishmael, born according to the flesh, was not numbered among the seed, but Isaac, born by the promise, was.

Third, at for this is the word of promise, he proves that his explanation is valid, when he says that the children of the promise are the ones signified by Isaac, namely, because Isaac was born as the result of a promise. Hence he says: for this is the word of promise. Indeed, this is the statement the angel or the Lord through an angel made to Abraham: about this time will I come, by which the time of grace is signified: when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son (Gal 4:4) and Sarah shall have a son on account of the promise. Hence, it is said: so that we might receive adoption of sons (Gal 4:5).

Then he clarifies his thesis so far as it concerns Jacob, when he says and not only she. First, he states his intention; second, he clarifies his position, at for when the children were not yet born. First, therefore, he says: and not only she, namely, Sarah, begot a son about whom the promise was made, but when Rebecca also, having in her womb two sons, one of whom pertained to the promise and the other only to the flesh, had conceived at once of Isaac our father. For it says in Genesis: Isaac prayed to the Lord for his wife, because she was barren, and the Lord gave her conception, but the children struggled together within her (Gen 25:21ff.).

And it should be noted that the Apostle cites this against the Jews who supposed that they would obtain justice through the merits of their forefathers, which is contrary to what is said about just men, namely, that they will deliver neither sons nor daughters but they alone will be delivered (Ezek 14:18). This is why John said to the Jews: do not presume to say: we have Abraham as our father (Matt 3:9). Paul, therefore, counters this opinion by reminding them that of Abraham’s children one was chosen and the other rejected. But he could have ascribed this difference to the mothers, because Ishmael was born of a slave and Isaac of a free woman, or to the changed meriting state of the father; because while uncircumcised he begot Ishmael but circumcised he begot Isaac. To exclude any such subterfuge, therefore, he cites the case where one is chosen and the other rejected, even though both were born of the same father and the same mother at the same time and, indeed, from one coition.

Then he clarifies his thesis, when he says for when the children were not yet born: first, by the authority of Genesis (Gen 25:24); second, by a text from the prophet Malachi, at as it is written. In regard to the first he does three things: first, he indicates the time of the promise and says that when the children were not yet born, one of the sons of Rebecca was set over the other in virtue of the promise. And just as his previous statement excluded the opinion of the Jews trusting in the merits of their forefathers, so this statement counters the error of the Manicheans who claimed that a person’s life and death were controlled by the constellation under which he was born, against what is said in Jeremiah: be not afraid of the signs of heaven which the heathens fear (Jer 10:2). Then when he continues: nor had done any good or evil, the Pelagian error is refuted which says that grace is given according to one’s preceding merits, even though it says in Titus: he saved us, not because of deeds done by us in justice, but in virtue of his own mercy (Titus 3:5). Both of these are shown false by the fact that before birth and before doing anything one of Rebecca’s sons is preferred to the other.

This also corrects Origen’s error who supposed that men’s souls were created when the angels were, and that they merited different lives depending on the merits they earned for the good or evil they had done there. This could not be true in the light of what is stated here, namely that for when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil. Against this also is Job: where were you when the morning stars praised me together and all the sons of God made joyful melody? (Job 38:7). For according to Origen’s error, he could have answered: I was among those joyful sons of God.

Second, at for he shall finish his word, he shows what could be understood from that promise by which one of the twins in the womb was chosen over the other. He says: in order that God’s purpose, by which one would be greater than the other, might stand, i.e., be made firm: and this not by reason of merits but according to election, i.e., inasmuch as God himself spontaneously forechose one over the other, not because he was holy but in order that he be holy, as it says in Ephesians: he chose us in himself before the foundation of the world that we should be holy (Eph 1:4). But this is a decree of predestination about which the same text says: predestined according to the purpose of his will (Eph 1:15).

Third, he sets down the promise, saying, not of works, for no works preceded it, as has been said: but of him who calls, i.e., through the grace of God calling, for it was said to her, i.e., Rebecca, that the elder, i.e., Esau, shall serve the younger, i.e., Jacob. This can be understood in three ways. In one way, as referring to the persons involved, and then Esau is understood to have served Jacob, not directly but indirectly, inasmuch as the persecution he launched against him ended in Jacob’s benefit, as it says in Proverbs: the fool will serve the wise (Prov 11:29). Second, it can be referred to the people who sprang from each, because the Edomites were once subject to the Israelites, as it says in a psalm: upon Edom I cast my shoe (Ps 60:8). This seems to fit Genesis: the nations are in your womb; the one shall be stronger than the other (Gen 25:23).

Third, it can be taken figuratively so that by the elder is understood the Jewish people, who were the first to receive the adoption of sons, in accord with Exodus, Israel is my firstborn son (Exod 4:22), and by the younger is understood the gentiles, who were called to the Father later and were signified by the prodigal son (Luke 15). The elder people in this case serve the younger, inasmuch as the Jews are our capsarii (slaves who carried boys’ satchels to school), guarding the books from which the truths of our faith are drawn: search the Scriptures (John 5:39).

Then he proves his point when he says as it is written, by the authority of the prophet Malachi speaking in the person of God who says: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated. A Gloss on this says that the statement, the elder shall serve the younger, was spoken from foreknowledge, but that the present statement results from judgment, i.e., that God loved Jacob on account of his good works, just as he loves all the saints: I love those who love me (Prov 8:17), but he hated Esau on account of his sins: the Highest hates sinners (Eccl 12:7). But because man’s love is preceded by God’s love: not that we loved God, but that he has first loved us (1 John 4:20), we must say that Jacob was loved by God before he loved God. Nor can it be said that God began to love him at a fixed point in time; otherwise his love would be changeable. Consequently, one must say that God loved Jacob from all eternity, as it says in Jeremiah: I have loved you with an everlasting love (Jer 31:3).

Now these words of the Apostle identify in God three things pertaining to the saints, namely, election, by which is understood God’s predestination and election. In God these are really the same, but in our understanding they differ. For it is called God’s love, inasmuch as he wills good to a person absolutely; it is election, inasmuch as through the good he wills for a person, he prefers him to someone else. But it is called predestination, inasmuch as he directs a person to the good he wills for him by loving and choosing him. According to these definitions predestination comes after love, just as the will’s fixation on the end naturally precedes the process of directing things toward the end.

Election and love, however, are ordered differently in God than in man. For in men, election precedes love, for a man’s will is inclined to love a thing on account of the good perceived in it, this good also being the reason why he prefers one thing to another and why he fixed his love on the thing he preferred. But God’s love is the cause of every good found in a creature; consequently, the good in virtue of which one is preferred to another through election follows upon God’s willing it—which pertains to his love. Consequently, it is not in virtue of some good which he selects in a man that God loves him; rather, it is because he loved him that he prefers him to someone by election.

But just as the love, about which we are speaking, pertains to God’s eternal predestination, so the hatred about which we are speaking pertains to the rejection by which God rejects sinners. It should not be supposed that this rejection is temporal, because nothing in the divine will is temporal; rather, it is eternal. Furthermore, it is akin to love or predestination in one respect and different in another. It is akin in the sense that just as predestination is preparation for glory, so rejection is preparation for punishment: for a burning place has long been prepared, yes, for the king it is made ready (Isa 30:33). It is different in that predestination implies preparation of the merits by which glory is reached, but rejection implies preparation of the sins by which punishment is reached. Consequently, a foreknowledge of merits cannot be the reason for predestination, because the foreknown merits fall under predestination; but the foreknowledge of sins can be a reason for rejection on the part of the punishment prepared for the rejected, inasmuch as God proposes to punish the wicked for the sins they have from themselves, not from God; the just he proposes to reward on account of the merits they do not have from themselves: destruction is your own, O Israel; your help is only in me (Hos 13:9).

Romans 9:30-33 – Israel‘s Stumbling

Lecture 5, n. 807-812

Then he draws the conclusion from the above, when he says what then shall we say? First, with respect to the gentiles; second, with respect to the Jews, at but Israel. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he draws his conclusion, saying: what then shall we say, in the light of the foregoing? I say it is this, namely, that the gentiles have attained it, i.e., justice, by which they are called sons: and such were some of you. But you were washed, you were justified (1 Cor 6:11). And this, indeed, from God’s calling and not from any merits, because he says, the gentiles who did not follow justice. At that time you were separated from Christ, alienated from the commonwealth of Israel (Eph 2:12). Second, he explains what he calls justice that is of faith, i.e., not that which consists in works. For the gentiles were not converted in order to observe the justice of the law, but to be justified through faith in Christ: the justice of God through faith in Jesus Christ upon all who believe (Rom 3:22).

Then when he says but Israel, he draws his conclusion as regards the Jews. And first he concludes what he intends, saying: but Israel, i.e., the people of the Jews, by following after the law of justice, is not come unto the law of justice. The law of justice is the law of the spirit of life through which men are made just and which the Jewish people did not attain, although they pursued it by observing the shadow of this spiritual law: the law has but a shadow of the good things to come (Heb 10:1). Or by following after the law of justice, i.e., the law of Moses, which is the law of justice, if it is well understood, because it teaches justice. Or it is called the law of justice, because it does not make men truly, but only outwardly, righteous, as long as sins are avoided not from love but from fear of the punishment that the law inflicted: hearken to me, you who pursue that which is just and you who seek the Lord (Isa 51:1); hearken to me, you who know what is just, my people, who have my law in your heart (Isa 51:7).

Second, he assigns the cause, saying, why is it that although they observed the law, they did not fulfill the law? Because they did not observe the law in the proper way. And this is what he says: because they sought it not by faith, i.e., they sought to be made just not through faith in Christ but as it were of works. For they followed the figure and repudiated the truth: for by the works of the law no human being shall be justified before him (Rom 3:20).

Third, he explains the cause assigned: first, he presents the explanation, saying, they have stumbled at the stumbling-stone, i.e., Christ, who is likened to a stumbling-stone; for just as a stone against which a man stumbles is not guarded against because it is small, so the Jews, seeing Christ clothed with our weakness, did not guard against stumbling over him: his look was as it were hidden and despised. Whereupon we esteemed him not (Isa 53:3); before your feet stumble upon the dark mountains (Jer 13:16), i.e., upon Christ and his apostles who are called dark mountains, because their great dignity is hidden.

Second, he cites an authority for this, saying: as it is written, namely, in Isaiah. Here the Apostle gathers together the words of Isaiah found in various places. For it says in Isaiah: behold, I will lay a stone in the foundations of Zion, a tried stone, a corner stone, a precious stone, founded in the foundation (Isa 28:16). From this he takes the first part of his quotation: behold, I lay in Zion a stone, i.e., as a foundation, by which is meant that by divine command Christ was established as the foundation of the Church: for no other foundation can anyone lay that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ (1 Cor 3:11).

Again it says in Isaiah: he shall be for a stone of stumbling and a rock of offense to the two houses of Israel (Isa 8:14). He uses this in the middle of the quotation where he says: a stone that will make men stumble, a rock that will make them fall. Here the stumbling refers to their ignorance, because it says in 1 Corinthians: if they had known this, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory (1 Cor 2:8); but the falling refers to their unbelief by reason of which they persecuted Christ and his apostles: we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews (1 Cor 1:23); behold, this child is set for the fall and rising of many in Israel (Luke 2:34).

The end of the quotation is taken from Isaiah: he who believes, let him not hasten (Isa 28:16). In place of this he says, and whosoever believes in him shall not be confounded, namely, because he will receive a reward from him: you who fears the Lord, hope in him: and your reward shall not be made void (Sir 2:8). The Apostle takes these words according to the Septuagint. Its sense pertains to what is in our text: he who believes, let him not hasten, for he seems to hasten, who considers himself deceived, because he does not quickly get what he hoped.

Romans 10:1-4 – The Zeal of the Jews

Lecture 1, n. 813-822

After showing how the gentiles have been called to faith by the election of God’s grace and also some of the Jews, i.e., a minority who did not stumble and fall, the Apostle now discusses in more detail the fall of the Jews. In regard to this he does three things. First, he explains the cause of their fall, over which he laments; from which he shows the cause of their fall to be miserable; second, he shows that their fall is not universal, at I say then (Rom 11:1); third, that it is neither unprofitable nor irreparable, at I say then (Rom 11:1). In regard to the first he does two things: first, he shows that their fall is lamentable, considering its cause; second, that it is not wholly inexcusable, at but I say: have they not heard? (Rom 10:18). In regard to the first he does two things: first, he shows that he feels pity for the Jews; second, the cause of his pity, at for I bear them witness.

First, therefore, he says: I have said that the Jews have not attained the law of justice, because they stumbled over the stumbling block. But I am not indignant against them; rather, I feel compassion. And, therefore, I say to you, brethren, whether you be converts from the gentiles or from the Jews: you are all brethren (Matt 23:8), the will of my heart is for their salvation, namely, that they be saved, as I have been saved: I wish that all were as I myself am (1 Cor 7:7); would to God that all who hear me this day might become such as I am (Acts 26:29). In this he was conformed to God, who desires all men to be saved (1 Tim 2:4). Not only his will but his prayer is directed to their salvation, but even the affection of his will, hence, he adds: and my prayer to God is for them unto salvation: far be it from me that I should sin against the Lord by ceasing to pray for you (1 Sam 12:23); pray for one another that you may be saved (Jas 5:16). This makes it clear that we should pray for unbelievers that they may be saved, because faith is a gift from God: by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God (Eph 2:8).

Then when he says, for I bear them witness, he discloses the cause of his compassion, namely, because they sinned from ignorance, not from set malice. In regard to this he does three things. First, he cites their ignorance; second, he shows the area of their ignorance, at for they, being ignorant of the justice; third, he proves the truth of those matters about which they were ignorant, at for Moses wrote.

First, therefore, he says: I desire and pray for their salvation and I grieve for them, because I bear them witness that they have a zeal of God, i.e., out of zeal for God they persecute Christ and his members: the hour is coming when whoever kills you will think he is offering service to God (John 16:2). He is a good witness to this, because he himself had once been in a similar state of mind: as to zeal a persecutor of the Church (Phil 3:6), but not according to knowledge, namely, because their zeal was not guided by correct knowledge as long as they were ignorant of the truth: therefore, my people go into exile for want of knowledge (Isa 5:13); if anyone does not recognize this, he will not be recognized (1 Cor 14:38).

Then when he says, for they, being ignorant, he shows wherein they were ignorant. First, he makes his statement; second, he explains it, at for the end of the law is Christ. First, therefore, he says: I am right in saying that it was not according to knowledge; for being ignorant of the justice of God, i.e., by which God justifies them through faith: the justice of God through faith in Jesus Christ, and seeking to establish their own justice (Rom 3:22), which consists in the works of the law, which in their opinion awaited nothing from God but depended solely on the decision of the performer. Consequently, he describes their justice as human and not divine, as he says above: if Abraham was justified by works, he has something to boast about before men, but not before God (Rom 4:2). For they . . . have not submitted themselves to the justice of God, i.e., they refused to be subject to Christ through faith in whom men are made just by God: only in God is my soul at rest (Ps 63:1); that the whole world may be subject to God (Rom 3:19); how long do you refuse to submit to me? (Exod 10:3).

Then when he says, for the end of the law is Christ, he explains what he had said, namely, that they are ignorant of God’s justice and refuse to submit to him, while they seek to establish their own justice based on the law. In regard to this it should be noted that, even as the philosophers say, the intention of any lawgiver is to make men virtuous: much more, then, the old law given by God to men was directed toward making men virtuous. But the law was unable to do this of itself, because the law made no one perfect (Heb 7:19); rather, it ordained men to Christ whom it promised and prefigured: the law was our custodian until Christ came, that we might be justified by faith (Gal 3:24). And that is what he says, namely, that the end of the law is Christ, to whom the whole law is ordained: I have seen the end of all perfection (Ps 119:96); the end that through Christ men may attain the justice the law intended: for God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do: sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, he condemned sin in the flesh in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us (Rom 8:3). And this to everyone who believes, because he justified his own by faith: to all who believed in his name he gave power to become children of God (John 1:12).

Then when he says, for Moses wrote, he proves the truth of those things about which the Jews were ignorant, namely, that God’s justice is more perfect than that of the law; and this he shows on the authority of Moses, the lawgiver of the old law. First, therefore, he shows by his words the condition of legal justice; second, he shows the condition of the justice of faith, at but the justice which is of faith.

First, therefore, he says: I have correctly distinguished human justice from God’s justice, for Moses wrote that the man who practices the justice which is based on the law shall live by it, where my text has: keep my laws and judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them and: they cast away my judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them (Ezek 20:13), namely because by observing the law a man obtained the advantage of not being killed as a transgressor of the law: a man who has violated the law of Moses dies without mercy (Heb 10:28); everyone who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death (Lev 20:9), and so on for the other commandments. We can also say that by observing the law a man was regulated in the present life, for the law promised temporal goods and commanded things which were bodily regulations imposed until a time of reformation (Heb 9:10).

Romans 10:18-21 – Israel‘s Voluntary Ignorance

Lecture 3, n. 845-858

After showing that the fall of the Jews is pitiable, because they sinned from ignorance, here the Apostle shows that their fall is not entirely excusable; because their ignorance was not invincible or rooted in necessity, but somehow voluntary. He shows this in two ways. First, because they heard the teaching of the apostles; second, from what they knew from the teachings of the law and of the prophets, at but I say: has not Israel known?

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he asks a question, saying: we have said that faith comes from hearing and that men cannot believe a person whom they have not heard. But I say, have they not heard? so as to be totally excused for their unbelief, according to what is said in John: if I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin (John 15:22). Second, he answers the question by interjecting the authority of the Psalm: their sound has gone forth into all the earth (Ps 19:4); i.e., the voice of the apostles whose fame has reached every land, both of Jews and of gentiles: with our ears we have heard the fame thereof (Job 28:22), namely, the wisdom preached by the apostles. For the Lord had commanded them: go into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature (Matt 28:19). And their words, i.e., their distinctive message, has gone out unto the ends of the whole world: from the ends of the earth we have heard praises (Isa 24:16); I have given you to be the light of the gentiles, to be my salvation even to the farthest part of the earth (Isa 49:6).

Then, when he says, but I say: has not Israel known, he shows that they were inexcusable, because of the knowledge they had from the law and the prophets. First, he raises the question, saying: but I say: has not Israel, i.e., the Jewish people, known the things which pertain to the mystery of Christ and to the calling of the gentiles and the fall of the Jews? They knew fully: instructed by the law (Rom 2:18); he has not dealt thus with another nation (Ps 147:20); we are happy, O Israel, because the things that are pleasing to God are made known to us (Bar 4:4).

Second, he says, first Moses says, he answers the question and shows that they did know: first, through the teaching of the law, saying, first, Moses, who is the lawgiver. By the fact that he says, first, it must not be understood as though there were two Moses, of whom he spoke of the first; but because Moses was the first, i.e., the chief teacher of the Jews: there has not risen a prophet since in Israel like Moses (Deut 34:12) or because he was the first among others to say this. I will provoke you to jealousy by that which is not a nation: by a foolish nation I will anger you. Here our text has this: I will provoke them by that which is not a people and by a foolish nation I will anger them (Deut 32:21).

Two differences should be noted here. The first in regard to gentiles, since he says, not a nation, as though unworthy to be called a nation, because the gentiles were not united in the worship of one god: there are two nations which my soul abhors, and the third is no nation, which I hate (Sir 50:27). But he called the same nation a foolish nation. If in some sense it could be called a nation, inasmuch as it is united and governed by human law, it is, nevertheless, called foolish, as though lacking true wisdom, which consists in the knowledge and worship of God: you must no longer live as the gentiles do, in the futility of their minds; they are darkened in their minds, alienated from the life of God (Eph 4:17). And in this way it refers to the gentiles, namely in their state before conversion.

These two things can also be applied to the gentiles after conversion. They are called not a nation, i.e., not living in a gentile manner, as the Apostle says in the same place: that henceforward you walk not as also the gentiles walk (Eph 4:17). And converted gentiles are also called foolish by those who do not believe: if anyone among you seems to be wise in this world, let him become foolish that he may be wise (1 Cor 3:18).

The second difference consists in the fact that he first mentions the jealousy, i.e., the envy with which the Jews envied the converted gentiles: they make much of you, but for no good purpose (Gal 4:17); second, he mentions the anger with which they were irked against them: the wicked man makes plots against the just man, and gnashes his teeth at him (Ps 37:12). These two are fittingly joined, because from envy springs anger: anger kills the foolish, and envy slays the little one (Job 5:2). But God is said to produce jealousy and stir to anger, not by causing the malice in them but by withdrawing grace, or rather by effecting the conversion of the gentiles from which the Jews take occasion for jealousy and anger.

Second, he shows that they knew through the teaching of the prophets, and first he quotes Isaiah as foretelling the conversion of the gentiles, saying, but Isaiah is bold and says, i.e., Isaiah boldly declares the truth, although this would put him in danger of death: he goes forth boldly to meet armed men (Job 39:21). And says: I was found by those who did not seek me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask for me; here our text has: they have sought me who before asked not for me, they have found me who sought me not (Isa 65:1).

He mentions first the conversion of the gentiles, saying, I was found by those who did not seek me. This shows that the conversion of the gentiles was beyond their merits and intention: Christ became a servant in order that the gentiles might glorify God for his mercy (Rom 15:9). About this finding Matthew says: the kingdom of heaven is like a treasure in a field, which a man found (Matt 13:44). Second, he shows the cause and manner of their conversion. The cause, indeed, because it was not by chance that they found what they were not seeking but by the grace of him who willed to appear to them. This is indicated, when he says: I appeared; the grace of God has appeared for the salvation of all men (Titus 2:11). The manner was that Christ did not appear to the gentiles in the enigmas and figures of the law but in plain truth; hence he says: I appeared openly. Behold, now you speak plainly and do not speak a proverb (John 16:29). I appeared openly to those, i.e., the gentiles, who did not ask after me, i.e., who did not ask for my doctrine: they keep on praying to a god that cannot save (Isa 45:20).

Then he shows that Isaiah foretold the unbelief of the Jews, saying: but to Israel, i.e., against Israel, he says: all the day long have I spread my hands to a people that does not believe and contradicts me. Here our text has this: I have spread forth my hands all the day to an unbelieving people, who walk in a way that is not good after their own thoughts. A people that continually provoke me to anger (Isa 65:2).

That he says, I have spread my hands, can be understood of Christ’s hands held out on the cross, which are said to have been held out all the day long, i.e., the principal part of a whole day, namely, from the sixth hour until evening (Matt 27:45). And although during that time the sun was darkened, the rocks rent, and the graves opened, the Jews persisted in their unbelief, blaspheming him, as it says in Matthew (Matt 28:39). Hence he adds, a people that does not believe and contradicts me: consider him who endured such contradiction against himself from sinners (Heb 12:3).

In another way, it can be taken as referring to God stretching out his hands to do miracles: when you stretch out your hand to cures and signs and prodigies to be worked through the holy name of your Son Jesus (Acts 4:30). The meaning then would be: all the day, i.e., through the whole time of my preaching, I have spread my hands, by working miracles, to a people that does not believe, even when they see miracles: if I had not done the works which no other man has done, they would not have sin (John 15:24); and contradicts me, i.e., slanders my miracles: by Beelzebub, the prince of demons, he casts out demons (Matt 12:24); your people are like those who contradict a priest (Hos 4:4).

Third, it can be understood of God stretching out his hands to give benefits to his people, in accord with Proverbs: I stretched out my hands, and there was none who paid attention (Prov 1:24). The meaning would then be: all the day, i.e., through the whole time of the law and the prophets, I spread my hands to give benefits to a people that does not believe and contradicts me: always you have been rebellious against the Lord (Deut 31:27).

Romans 11:1-10 – The Remnant of Israel

Lecture 1, n. 859-877

After showing that the fall of the Jews is deplorable, though not entirely excusable, the Apostle now shows that it is not universal. In regard to this he does three things: first, he raises a question; second, he answers it, at God forbid; third, he draws a conclusion, at what then. He says, therefore: I say then: has God entirely cast away his people? i.e., the Jews, because he calls them unbelieving and contrary. Even the Psalmist asks: O God, why dost you cast us forever? (Ps 74:1); the Lord has scorned his altar (Lam 2:7).

Then when he says, God forbid, he answers the question and shows that God has not totally rejected the Jewish people. And this is what he says: God forbid that the Jewish people be rejected in their entirety. He proves this, first of all, with respect to himself, saying: for I also, living in the faith of Christ, am an Israelite by race: are they Israelites? So am I (2 Cor 11:22). And because there were among the people of Israel some proselytes not descended in the flesh from the patriarchs, he says that this is not so of him, adding: of the seed of Abraham: are they descendants of Abraham? So am I (2 Cor 11:23). Furthermore, among the Jewish people the tribes were distinguished according to the sons of Jacob, some of whom were sons of slaves and some of wives. Joseph and Benjamin were sons of Rachel, Jacob’s fondest wife. Hence he shows his eminence among the Jewish people, saying: of the tribe of Benjamin: of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin (Phil 3:5). Hence, some apply to Paul what is in Genesis: Benjamin is a ravenous wolf, in the morning devouring the prey, and at evening dividing the spoil (Gen 49:27).

Second, when he says: God has not cast away, he shows that his people has not been rejected by God in regard to many chosen ones. And first he states his proposition; second, he recalls a similar situation, saying do you not know; third, he adapts it, at even so then, at this present time. First, therefore, he says: not only have I not been rejected, but God has not cast away his people which he foreknew, i.e., the predestined ones. For whom he foreknew, he also predestined (Rom 8:29). For the Lord will not reject his people (Ps 94:14). The Apostle applies this to the predestined.

Then when he says, do you not know, he recalls a similar situation which occurred during the time of Elijah, when all the people seemed to have turned from the worship of the one God. First, he presents Elijah’s plea; second, the Lord’s reply, at but what does the divine answer say. First, therefore, he says: do you not know what the Scripture says of Elias, i.e., in 1 Kings (1 Kgs 19:10). Or, of Elias, i.e., in the book written about Elijah. For the entire book of Kings was written mainly to make known the sayings and deeds of the prophets. That is why it is counted among the prophetic books, as Jerome says. How he, namely Elijah himself, calls on God against Israel.

In this intervention Isaiah alleges two things against them. First, the impiety they committed against the worship of God. In one way, by persecuting his ministers, to which he refers when he says: Lord, they have slain your prophets: has it not been told my Lord what I did when Jezebel killed the prophets of the Lord? (1 Kgs 18:13); which of the prophets did not your fathers persecute? (Acts 7:52). In another way, they committed impiety against God’s holy places, as it says: they set the sanctuary on fire (Ps 74:7). In regard to this he says: they have dug down your altars.

Third, he alleges against them the impiety they intended to do, saying: and I am left alone, namely, to worship the one God, because the rest did not show very clearly that they were God’s worshippers. For it says of him: and Elijah the prophet stood up, as a fire, and his word burnt like a torch (Sir 48:1). And they seek my life, namely that they might carry him away. For Jezebel had sent word to Elijah, saying: so may the gods do to me, if I do not make your life as the life of one of them (1 Kgs 19:2), namely of the prophets of Baal whom Elijah had killed.

Then when he says but what does, he gives the divine reply, saying: but what does the divine answer say to him, i.e., to Elijah. It is this: I have left me, i.e., for my worship by not permitting them to fall into sin, seven thousand men (this definite number is put in place of the uncertain number, because seven and thousand are perfect numbers), that have not bowed their knees to Baal, i.e., who have not abandoned the worship of God: all who call on my name, whom I created for my glory (Isa 43:17).

Then when he says, even so then, he adapts all this to the present situation. First, he sets out the adaptation, saying: even so then, at this present time also, in which a multitude of people seems to have gone astray, there is a remnant saved according to the election of God’s grace, i.e., according to the gratuitous choice of God: you have not chosen me, but I have chosen you (John 15:16). Second, he draws the conclusion from this: and if by grace they have been saved, it is not now by works: he saved us, not because of deeds done by us in justice, but in virtue of his own mercy (Titus 3:5). Third, that this conclusion follows from the premises is shown when he says: otherwise, i.e., if grace is in virtue of works, grace is no more grace, which is so called because it is freely given: being justified freely by his grace (Rom 3:24).

Then when he says, what then, he draws the conclusion he intended. And first he sets it out, saying what then shall we say follows from what has been said? This, namely, that Israel, as far as the greater part of its people was concerned, has not obtained that which it sought, namely, justice. This is the way one must interpret what was said above: but Israel, by following after the law of justice, is not come unto the law of justice (Rom 9:31). You shall seek me, and shall not find me (John 7:34). Nevertheless, the election, i.e., the elect of the Jews, has obtained it: he chose us in him, that we should be holy (Eph 1:4). But the rest, i.e., the remainder of the people, have been blinded because of their malice: their own malice blinded them (Wis 1:22).

Then when he says, as it is written, he clarifies the first part of the conclusion: first, on the authority of Isaiah; second, of David, at and David says. In regard to the first it should be noted that the Apostle bases himself on two passages from Isaiah. For it says in Isaiah: the Lord has poured out upon you a spirit of deep sleep (Isa 29:10). In regard to this he says: God has given them the spirit of compunction, which has to do with a perversity of emotion. For compunction implies a puncturing of the heart or sorrow. Hence there is good compunction by which one grieves over his own sins, as it says in a psalm: you have made us drunk with the wine of compunction (Ps 60:3). There is also evil compunction, i.e., the compunction of envy, by which one grieves over the goods of another. Therefore God gave them this spirit of compunction, i.e., envy, not by instilling malice but by withdrawing grace, as was said above: I will provoke you to jealousy by that which is not a nation (Rom 10:19).

Likewise it says in Isaiah: make the heart of this people fat, and their eyes heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes and hear with their ears (Isa 6:10). And in regard to this he designates their weakened power of knowing, when he adds eyes that they should not see the miracles which Christ performed in their presence, and ears that they should not hear fruitfully the teachings of Christ and the apostles: you that see many things, will you not observe them? You that have ears open, will you not hear? (Isa 42:20). To this the Apostle adds on his own: until this present day, because they will see and hear at the end of the world, when the hearts of the children will be converted to the hearts of their fathers, as it says in Malachi 4:5.

Then when he says, and David says, he presents the authority of David on the same point. First, he touches on the things which occasioned the fall of the Jews, saying let their table, i.e., the malice with which sinners are nourished: though wickedness is sweet in his mouth, though he hides it under his tongue (Job 20:12). This table is before them, when they sin from malice aforethought and it becomes a snare, i.e., a temptation to sin: he who comes out of the pit shall be caught in the snare: (Isa 24:18), and a trap, when they succumb to the pleasure of the temptation: they shall be trapped and taken (Isa 8:15), and a stumbling block, when they fall from one sin into another: much peace to those who love your law, and it is not a stumbling block to them (Ps 119:165), and a retribution unto them, namely, when they will be punished for their sins. Or because the very fact that God permits them so to fall is itself a retribution for their sins: render to the proud their deserts (Ps 94:2).

Or the table is the Sacred Scripture put before the Jews: she has set forth her table (Prov 9:2). It becomes a snare, when something ambiguous occurs; a trap, when it is not correctly understood; a stumbling block, when it falls into obstinate error; and a retribution, as explained above. Second, he mentions the weakening of their power to understand when he says: let their eyes be darkened, that they may not see, which is said more as a prediction than as a desire: having their understanding darkened (Eph 4:18). And he mentions the effect when he says, and their backs, i.e., free choice, which carries something for good or for evil, bow down always, i.e., bend from eternal things to temporal things, from the path of justice to iniquity: bow down, that we may pass over (Isa 51:23).

Romans 11:11-16 – The Fall of the Jews for the Salvation of the Gentiles

Lecture 2, n. 878-893

After showing that the fall of the Jews is not universal, the Apostle now begins to show that their fall was neither useless nor irreparable. In regard to this he does two things: first, he shows that the fall of the Jews is useful and reparable; second, he disputes the gentiles’ boasting against the Jews, at and if some of the branches (Rom 11:17). In regard to the first he does two things: first, he asks a question; second, he answers it, at God forbid.

First, therefore, he says: it has been stated and proved that except for the chosen, the rest of the Jews have been blinded. So the question arises: have they so stumbled, that they should fall? This can be interpreted in two ways: the first way is this: has God permitted them to stumble only that they should fall, i.e., not for any benefit that might follow but merely willing their fall? This, of course, would be contrary to God’s goodness which, as Augustine says, is so great that it would not permit any evil to occur except for some good, which he draws out of the evil. Hence it says in Job: he shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and shall make others to stand in their stead (Job 34:24); and in Revelation: hold fast what you have, so that no one may seize your crown (Rev 3:11), namely, because God permits some to fall in order that their fall be the occasion of salvation for others. Another interpretation is this: have they so stumbled, that they should fall, i.e., that they should remain fallen forever? Will he not rise again from where he lies? (Ps 41:8).

Then when he says, God forbid, he answers the question: first, according to the first interpretation, showing that the fall of the Jews was useful; second, he resolves the question according to the second interpretation, showing that the Jews‘ situation is reparable, at now if the offense of them. First, therefore, he says: God forbid that they fell to no use; but rather, by their, namely, the Jews‘, offense, salvation is come to the gentiles. Hence the Lord himself says: salvation is from the Jews (John 4:22).

This can be understood in three ways. In the first way, that by their offense, which they committed in killing Christ, the salvation of the gentiles was obtained through the redemption of Christ’s blood: you know that you were ransomed not with perishable things, such as silver or gold, but with the precious blood of the Lamb (1 Pet 1:18). In the second way, it can be understood of the trespass by which they rejected the teaching of the apostles, with the result that the apostles preached to the gentiles, as it says in Acts: it was necessary that the word of God should be spoken first to you. Since you thrust it from you, we turn to the gentiles (Acts 13:46). In a third way it can be understood as meaning that on account of their impenitence they have been scattered among all the nations. As a result Christ and the Church had from the books of the Jews testimony to the Christian faith helpful in converting the gentiles, who might have suspected that the prophecies concerning Christ, which the preachers of the faith brought forward, were fabricated, if they had not been proven by the testimony of the Jews; hence it says in a psalm: let me look in triumph on my enemies, i.e., the Jews; slay them not, lest my people forget, make them totter by your power (Ps 59:10).

There follows so that they may be emulous of them. And because he does not say who or whom, and since there are two kinds of emulousness, namely that of indignation and that of imitation, this phrase can be explained in four ways. The first way is this. That the gentiles may be emulous of them, namely the Jews, such that they imitate them in the worship of the one God: you were at one time without Christ, alien to the way of life of Israel, and later he adds, but now you, who were once far off, have been drawn near in the blood of Christ (Eph 2:12); you have become imitators of the churches of God (1 Thess 2:14), which are in Judea. Or it can be interpreted this way. The gentiles are emulous of the Jews, i.e., they are indignant against them on account of their unbelief: I beheld the transgressors and I pined away, because they do not keep your words (Ps 118:158). Third, it can be understood in this way. The Jews are emulous, i.e., imitate the gentiles when everywhere, and now some of them particularly, they are converted to the faith, imitating the faith of the gentiles; and in the end all Israel will be saved when the fullness of the gentiles have entered. Thus will be fulfilled what is said in Deuteronomy: he will be the head and you will be the tail (Deut 28:44). Fourth, it can be interpreted this way. The Jews are emulous of the gentiles, i.e., are disturbed out of envy towards them when they see their glory passing over to them: I will provoke you by that which is not a people (Deut 22:21).

Then when he says, now if the offense of them, he answers the question as interpreted in the second way and shows that the fall of the Jews is reparable. He does this in three ways: first, from its usefulness; second, from the Apostle’s intention, at for I say to you; third, from the condition of that people, at for if the firstfruit be holy. In regard to the first he presents the following reason: a good is more powerful than an evil in producing usefulness, but the evil which befell the Jews produced something very useful for the gentiles, therefore, their good will produce greater usefulness for the world. What he is saying is this: it has been said that by their trespass the salvation of the gentiles was achieved. Now if the offense of them, i.e., the Jews‘, be the riches of the world, i.e., for the gentiles, because the trespass of the Jews resulted in spiritual riches for the gentiles, about which it is said: riches of salvation, wisdom and knowledge (Isa 33:6), which refers to their guilt. And the diminution of them, by which they fell from the lofty glory they had, pertains to their punishment. For we are diminished more than any nation and are brought low in all the earth this day for our sins (Dan 3:37). They were, however, an occasion of the riches of the gentiles, as was said. Or the diminution of them, i.e., some of the least and most humble of the Jews, namely the apostles, enriched the nations spiritually, about which 1 Corinthians says: God chose the weak things of the world, that he might confound the strong (1 Cor 1:27). How much more will the fullness of them, i.e., their spiritual abundance or their multitude converted to God, result in riches for the gentiles? My abode is in the full assembly of saints (Sir 24:16). And so, if for the benefit of the whole world God permitted the Jews to do wrong and be diminished, much more will he repair their disaster for the benefit of the whole world.

Then when he says, for I say to you, gentiles, he shows the same things by revealing the purpose of his ministry, which he first states; second, he assigns the reason, at for if the loss. In regard to the first it should be noted that whereas the previous parts of the epistle were directed to all the believers in Rome, whether from the Jews or from the gentiles, he is now directing his words to the converted gentiles. He says, therefore: I have stated that their fullness will mean riches for the world. As testimony to this I say to you, gentiles, i.e., gentiles converted to the faith: I said, ‘behold me’ to a nation that did not call upon my name (Isa 65:1). This, I repeat, I say to you: as long indeed as I am the apostle of the gentiles, the special care of whom has fallen to me on account of the office entrusted to me: they gave to me and to Barnabas the right hands of fellowship: that we should go unto the gentiles, and they unto the circumcision (Gal 2:9); for this was I appointed a preacher and apostle, a teacher of the gentiles in faith and truth (1 Tim 2:7); I will honor my ministry, not with things that pertain to worldly honor: but first by adorning it with good morals: as servants of God we commend ourselves in every way in much patience. (2 Cor 6:4). Second, by performing extra works to which he was not bound: what is my reward then? That preaching the Gospel, I may deliver the Gospel without charge, that I abuse not my power in the Gospel (1 Cor 9:18). Third, by increasing his solicitude for the salvation of all: besides those things which are without: my daily instance, the solicitude for all the churches (2 Cor 11:28).

Hence he adds: if, by any means, I may provoke to emulation them who are my flesh, i.e., the Jews, who are my kinsmen according to the flesh (Rom 9:3): do not despise your own flesh (Isa 58:7). And that they may emulate by good emulation, as is said in 1 Corinthians: emulate the better gifts (1 Cor 12:31). And in this way I may save some of them, namely, of the Jews: not seeking my own advantage but that of many, that they may be saved (1 Cor 10:33).

Then, when he says for if, he assigns the reason for his interest, namely, that the conversion of the Jews would contribute to the salvation of the gentiles. Hence he says, for if the loss of them, i.e., their unbelief and disobedience, as a slave is said to be lost when he flees from the care and obedience of his master: my people have been a lost flock (Jer 50:6). If, I say, the loss of the Jews occasions the reconciliation of the world, inasmuch as we have been reconciled to God through the death of Christ, what shall the receiving of them be, but life from the dead? I.e., that the Jews will be accepted again by God, as it says in Zechariah: I took unto me two rods (Zech 11:17). What, I say, will such an acceptance mean but that it will make the gentiles rise to life? For gentiles are the believers who will grow lukewarm: because wickedness is multiplied, most men’s love will grow cold (Matt 24:12), or will fall away entirely, being deceived by the Antichrist. These will be restored to their primitive fervor after the conversion of the Jews. And as the gentiles were reconciled after their enmity, the Jews having fallen away, so after the conversion of the Jews, the end of the world being then imminent, there will be a general resurrection, through which men will return from the dead to immortal life.

Then when he says, for if the firstfruit, he proves the same thing by considering the status of the Jewish race. This he does in two ways. First, on the part of the apostles, when he says: if the firstfruit be holy, so is the lump also. That is called the representative portion which is taken from the whole lump of dough, as if for approval. The apostles chosen by God from the Jewish people are the representative sample taken from the whole lump. If, therefore, the apostles are holy, the consequence is that the Jewish people are holy. You are a holy nation, God’s own people (1 Pet 2:9).

Second, he proves the same thing on the part of the patriarchs, who are compared to the Jews as root to branches; hence it says in Isaiah: there shall come forth a rod from the root of Jesse (Isa 11:1). If, therefore, the patriarchs, who are the root, are holy, then the Jews, who grew from them as branches, are also holy. And his root shall shoot forth as that of Libanus, and his branches shall spread (Hos 14:6).

Romans 11:17-24 – Prohibition of Boasting Against the Jews

Lecture 3, n. 894-911

After showing that the fall of the Jews was useful and reparable, the Apostle now forbids the gentiles to boast against the Jews. In regard to this he does two things: first, he shows that the converted gentiles must not boast against the Jews; second, he answers an objection from the gentiles, at you will say then. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he forbids the gentiles to boast against the Jews; second, he gives the reason for this prohibition, at but if you boast.

There seemed to be two things that might tempt the gentiles to boast against the Jews. First, the defection of the Jews. Hence he says: we have stated that if the root is holy, so too the branches. And if some of the branches, i.e., some of the Jews but not all, be broken, i.e., separated from the faith of their fathers who are compared as the root, do not boast: the flame will dry up his shoots (Job 15:30); the branches not being perfect shall be broken (Wis 4:5). The second ground for boasting was their own promotion. But the lower the state from which one has been promoted, the more he is inclined to vain boasting, as it says in Proverbs: by three things the earth is disturbed, and the fourth it cannot bear: by a slave when he reigns (Prov 30:21). Hence he reminds them of the low state from which they were raised, saying: and you, O gentile, when you were a gentile, being a wild olive, i.e., a tree bearing no fruit: he shall be like tamaric in the desert (Jer 17:6); every tree that does not bear fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire (Matt 3:10).

Then he describes their promotion. First, that they have been raised to the dignity of that race; hence, he says: are ingrafted in them, i.e., in their place: he shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and shall make others to stand in their stead (Job 34:24). Second, that they have been made associates of the patriarchs, whom he had compared to the root; hence he says: and are made partaker of the root, i.e., united to the patriarchs and prophets: many will come from the east and west, and sit at the table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven (Matt 8:11). Third, that they share the glory of the apostles when he says: and are made partaker of the fatness of the olive tree. The Jewish race is called the olive tree on account of the rich spiritual fruit they bore: the Lord called you once a plentiful olive tree, fruitful and beautiful (Jer 11:16); I am like a green olive tree in the house of God (Ps 52:8). But just as the roots of this olive tree are the patriarchs and prophets, so its richness is the abundance of the Holy Spirit’s grace, which the apostles had more than all the others, as a Gloss says. Whence the olive tree was led to say: can I leave my fatness . . . to come to be promoted among the trees? (Judg 9:9); let my soul be filled as with marrow and fatness (Ps 62:6). This, therefore, is the way the gentiles have been promoted to a partnership with that people, namely, with the patriarchs, apostles, and prophets: you are fellow citizens with the saints and members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets (Eph 2:19). And although these may seem to be reasons for boasting, do not boast against the branches, i.e., against the Jews: your boasting is not good (1 Cor 5:1).

Then when he says, but if you boast, he gives the reason for his admonition, saying: but if in spite of this admonition you boast by insulting the Jews, who stand upright or have been cut off, you should consider as a check to your boasting that you do not bear the root: but the root bears you, i.e., Judea did not receive salvation from the gentiles, but just the reverse: salvation is from the Jews (John 4:22). Hence, Abraham was promised that all the nations of the earth would be blessed in him (Gen 22:18).

Then when he says, you will say then, he excludes an objection from the gentiles: first, he presents the objection; second, he excludes it from a consideration of divine justice, at well; third, he urges them to diligently consider God’s judgments, at see then the goodness. First, therefore, he says: therefore, O gentile, who boasts against the Jews, you might say: the branches were broken off that I might be grafted in, i.e., God permitted the Jews to fall from faith, so that I might enter into faith. But no one accepts the loss of one thing save for something more precious and more desired, just as a physician allows a foot to remain sore in order to heal the eye. Thus, it would seem that the gentile nations are more valuable and acceptable to God than Judea. Hence it says in Malachi: I have no pleasure in you, says the Lord of hosts, and I will not accept an offering from your hands. For from the rising of the sun to its setting my name is great among the nations (Mal 1:10), and in Isaiah: it is too light a thing that you should be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob; I will give you as a light to the nations (Isa 49:6).

Then when he says, well, he excludes the objection. First, he assigns the reason why the Jews fell away and the gentiles were promoted, saying: well, i.e., it is good that God permitted branches to be broken off, so that you might be grafted in, but consider the cause of the breaking off of the branches. It is because of unbelief, i.e., because they refused to believe in Christ, they were broken off: for you are among unbelievers and destroyers (Ezek 2:6); if I speak the truth, why do you not believe me? (John 8:46). But you, O gentile, stand by faith, i.e., by believing in Christ, through whom you have obtained grace: for in faith you stand (2 Cor 1:23); I preached to you the Gospel, in which you stand, by which you are saved (1 Cor 15:1). Second, he gives an admonition, saying: be not highminded, i.e., do not presume on yourself beyond yourself: not minding high things, but consenting to the humble (Rom 12:16); Lord, my heart is not exalted: nor are my eyes lofty (Ps 130:1); but fear, lest you too be broken off because of unbelief: blessed is the man that is always fearful: but he that is hardened in mind, will fall into evil (Prov 28:14); the fear of the Lord drives out sin (Sir 1:27).

The reason for this admonition is given when he says: for if God has not spared the natural branches, i.e., the Jews, who descended by natural origin from the patriarchs, but allowed them to be broken off, fear lest perhaps also he does not spare you, i.e., lest he permit you to be broken off because of unbelief: the jealously and rage of the husband will not spare on the day of revenge (Prov 6:34); I will not spare and I will not pardon; nor will I have mercy, but to destroy them (Jer 13:14). This, therefore, is the Apostle’s answer; that when someone sees that he has obtained grace and another has fallen, he should not boast against the fallen but rather fear for himself, because pride is the cause of falling headlong and fear is the cause of carefulness and being kept safe.

Then when he says, see then the goodness and the severity of God, he invites them to a close scrutiny of divine judgments: first, he invites them to consider; second, he instructs them as though unable to consider by themselves, at for I would not have you ignorant (Rom 11:25); third, as though he himself were not perfectly capable of this investigation, he exclaims in admiration of God’s wisdom, at O the depth of the riches (Rom 11:33). In regard to the first he does three things: first, he shows what should be considered, saying: see then, i.e., give careful consideration to, the goodness of God, having mercy: how good, O Israel, is God to the upright of heart (Ps 72:1); or do you despise the riches of his goodness? (Rom 2:4). And his severity in punishing: O Lord, you God of vengeance (Ps 94:1); the Lord is a jealous God and avenging (Nah 1:2). For the first consideration begets hope; the second begets fear, so that despair and presumption are avoided.

Second, he indicates the ones affected by each of these two qualities, saying: towards them indeed that are fallen, i.e., the Jews, the severity: the Lord has destroyed without mercy all the habitations of Jacob (Lam 2:2); but towards you, the engrafted gentile, the goodness: you have dealt kindly with your servant, O Lord (Ps 119:65). Third, he shows how the foregoing points should be considered, since the situation is not immutable but could change in the future. First, he shows this with respect to the gentiles, saying: towards you, I say, goodness, if you abide in goodness: remain in my love (John 15:9). Otherwise, if you do not strive to persevere through fear and humility, you also shall be cut off: every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down (Matt 3:10).

Second, he shows the same with respect to the Jews. First, he states the fact: and they also, namely, the Jews, if they do not abide still in unbelief, shall be grafted in, i.e., restored to their former status: you have prostituted yourself to many lovers. Nevertheless, return to me, says the Lord (Jer 3:1). Then he proves what he has said: first, from God’s power, saying: for God is able to graft them in again; therefore, their salvation is not to be despaired of: behold, the Lord’s hand is not shortened, that it cannot save (Isa 59:1).

Second, by arguing from the lesser, saying: for if you, O gentile, were cut out of the wild olive tree, i.e., from gentileness, which by nature was not fruit-bearing, not as God made nature, but because it was spoiled by sin: they were a wicked generation, and their malice natural (Wis 12:10); we were by nature children of wrath (Eph 2:3); and were grafted into the good olive tree, i.e., into the faith of the Jews, contrary to nature, i.e., against the common course of nature. For it is not the custom to graft the branch of a bad tree onto a good tree, but vice versa. But what God does is not against nature; it is natural in the fullest sense. For we call that natural which is caused by an agent to which the patient is naturally subject, even if it is not in keeping with the specific nature of the patient; for just as the ebb and flow of the sea is natural, because it is produced by the motion of the moon, to which the water is naturally subject, although it is not natural to the nature of water: so, too, since every creature is naturally subject to God, whatever God does in creatures is natural in the full sense, although it is not natural to the proper and particular nature of the thing in which it is done, say when a blind man has sight restored or a dead man is revived.

If, I say, this was contrary to nature, how much more shall they that are the natural branches, i.e., which by natural origin pertain to the Jewish nation, be grafted into their own olive tree, i.e., be brought back to the greatness of their nation: he will turn the hearts of fathers to their children, and the hearts of children to their fathers (Mal 4:6).

Romans 11:25-32 – The Mystery of Israel‘s Future Salvation

Lecture 4, n. 912-932

After leading the gentiles to a knowledge of the divine judgments, in which God’s goodness and severity were manifested, the Apostle, acting as though they are still unable to consider these things, explains how they seem to him. First, he presents the fact; second, he proves it, at as it is written; third, he gives the reason, at for as you also. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he states his intention, saying: I have urged you to consider the kindness and severity of God, for I would not have you ignorant, brethren, of this mystery, for you cannot grasp all mysteries. Hence, this is a prerogative of the perfect to whom the Lord says: to you it has been given to understand the mystery of God’s kingdom (Luke 8:9); I will not hide from you the mysteries of God (Wis 6:24). But ignorance of this mystery would be very damaging to us: but if any man know not, he shall not be known (1 Cor 14:38).

Second, he discloses the reason for his intention: lest you should be wise in your own conceits, i.e., that you not presume on your own understanding to condemn others and prefer yourself to them: be not wise in your own conceits (Rom 12:16); woe to those who are wise in their own eyes, and shrewd in their own sight (Isa 5:21). Third, he states what he intended. First, with respect to the fall of particular Jews, when he says: that blindness in part has happened in Israel, not universally but upon a part: blind the heart of this people (Isa 6:10). Second, he predicts the end of this blindness, saying: until the fullness of the gentiles should come in to the faith, i.e., not only some gentile nations as were then converted; but either in all or the greater part the Church would be established: the earth is the Lord’s and all its fullness (Ps 24:1). The gentiles converted to the faith are said to come in, as though from the exterior and visible things they venerated into spiritual things and the divine will: come into his presence with singing (Ps 100:2).

It should be noted that the word until can signify the cause of the blindness of the Jews. For God permitted them to be blinded, in order that the full number of the gentiles come in. It can also designate the termination, i.e., that the blindness of the Jews will last up to the time when the full number of the gentiles will come to the faith. With this agrees his next statement, namely, and then, i.e., when the full number of the gentiles has come in, all Israel should be saved, not some, as now, but universally all: I will save them by the Lord their God (Hos 1:7); he will again have compassion upon us (Mic 7:19).

Then when he says, as it is written, he proves what he had said about the future salvation of the Jews: first, he proves this with an authority; second, with a reason, at as concerning the Gospel. First, therefore, he says: I say that all Israel should be saved, as it is written, where our text says: a redeemer will come from Zion and this will be my covenant with them that return to Jacob says the Lord (Isa 59:20). But the Apostle uses the Septuagint and touches on three things. First, the coming of a Savior, when he says: there shall come he that shall deliver, namely, God in human flesh to save us, out of Zion, i.e., from the Jewish people who are signified by Zion, the citadel of Jerusalem, a city in Judea. Hence it says in Zechariah: rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion! Shout aloud, O daughter of Jerusalem! Lo, our king comes to you (Zech 9:9), and in John: salvation is from the Jews (John 4:22). Or he says that he comes from Zion, not because he was born there, but because his doctrine went from there into the whole world, inasmuch as the apostles received the Holy Spirit in the cenacle in Zion: out of Zion shall go forth the law (Isa 2:3).

Second, he touches on salvation by Christ offered to the Jews, saying: he who shall deliver and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob. This could refer to deliverance from punishment: he will snatch my soul from death (Ps 115:8). He shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob could refer to deliverance from guilt: O that deliverance for Israel would come from Zion (Ps 53:6). Or both could refer to liberation from guilt, but he says he who shall deliver, because of the few, who now are converted with great difficulty and with, so to speak, a certain violence: as if a shepherd should get out of the lion’s mouth two legs, or the tip of the ear, so shall the children of Israel be taken out (Amos 3:12). But he says he shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob to show the ease with which the Jews will be converted at the end of the world: who is a God like you, pardoning iniquity and passing over transgression for the remnant of his inheritance? (Mic 7:18).

Third, he shows the manner of salvation when he says: and this is to them my covenant, a new one from me, when I shall take away their sins. For the old covenant did not remove sins, because it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins (Heb 10:4). Therefore, because the Old Testament was imperfect, a New Testament is promised to them: I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah (Jer 31:31) and it will have the power to remit sin through the blood of Christ: this is my blood of the new covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins (Matt 26:28); he will cast all our sins into the depths of the sea (Mic 7:19).

Then when he says, as concerning the Gospel, he proves his statement with a reason: first, he presents the proof; second, he removes an objection, at for the gifts and the calling. First, therefore, he says that their sins will be taken away and that after they have sins, they are enemies of Christ. As concerning the Gospel, indeed, which they resist, they are enemies for your sake, i.e., it has turned out to your benefit. Hence, it says in Luke: as for those enemies of mine, who did not want me to reign over them, bring them here and slay them before me (Luke 19:27); and in John: but now they have seen and hated both me and my Father (John 15:24). Or as concerning the Gospel means their enmity has helped the Gospel, which has been spread everywhere by reason of such enmity: in the word of truth of the Gospel, which has come to you, as indeed in the whole world it is bearing fruit and growing (Col 1:5). But they are most dear to God for the sake of the forefathers, and this as touching the election, because he chose their descendants on account of their forefathers’ grace: the Lord loved your fathers and chose their descendants after them (Deut 10:15). This does not mean that the merits established by the fathers were the cause of the eternal election of the descendants, but that God from all eternity chose the fathers and the sons in such a way that the children would obtain salvation on account of the fathers; not as though the merits of the fathers were sufficient for the salvation of the sons, but through an outpouring of divine grace and mercy, the sons would be saved on account of the promises made to the fathers. Or it can mean as touching the election, i.e., as regards those elected from that people, salvation was obtained. For if they are dear to God, it is reasonable that they be saved by God: the eye has not seen, O God, besides you, what things you have prepared for them that wait for you (Isa 64:4).

Then when he says, for the gifts and the calling, he excludes an objection. For someone might claim that even though the Jews were formerly beloved on account of their forefathers, nevertheless the hostility they exert against the Gospel prevents them from being saved in the future. But the Apostle asserts that this is false, saying: for the gifts and calling of God are without repentance. As if to say: that God gives something to certain ones or calls certain ones is without repentance, because God does not change his mind: the triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance (1 Sam 15:29); the Lord has sworn and will not change his mind (Ps 110:4).

Then, when he says, for as you also, he gives the reason for the future salvation of the Jews after their unbelief. First, he shows a similarity between the salvation of both people; second, the cause of this similarity, at for God has concluded. First, therefore, he says: so I say that Israel will be saved, although they are now enemies. For as you also, gentiles, in times past did not believe God: you were once without God in the world (Eph 2:12); but now have obtained mercy: the gentiles are to glorify God for his mercy (Rom 15:9); I will have mercy on him who was without mercy (Hos 2:23). And this was through their unbelief, which was the occasion of your salvation, as was said above. So these also, i.e., the Jews, now, i.e., in the time of grace, have not believed, namely, in Christ: why do you not believe in me? (John 8:46). And this is what he adds: for your mercy, i.e., in Christ’s grace, by which you have obtained mercy: you have saved us according to your mercy (Titus 3:5). Or they have not believed so that they might enter into your mercy. Or they have not believed, which turned out to be the occasion of the mercy shown to you, that they also at some time may obtain mercy: the Lord will have compassion on Jacob (Isa 14:1).

Then, when he says for God has concluded, he assigns the reason for this similarity, namely that God has willed to have mercy on all. And this is what he adds, for God has concluded, i.e., permitted to be concluded, all, i.e., every race of men, both Jews and gentiles, in unbelief, as in a certain bond of error: all were fettered with the bonds of darkness (Wis 17:2). That he may have mercy on all, i.e., that he may have mercy on every race of men: but you have mercy upon all (Wis 17:24). This does not extend to the demons in accord with the error of Origen, nor even to all men individually, but to every race of men. For the distribution is made according to races of individuals and not according to individuals of races. But God wills all to be saved by his mercy, so that they might be humbled by this and ascribe their salvation not to themselves but to God: destruction is your own, O Israel: your help is only in me (Hos 13:9); that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may be made subject to God (Rom 3:19).

Romans 11:33-36 – The Incomprehensible Wisdom of God

Lecture 5, n. 933-952

Above the Apostle endeavored to assign a reason for the divine judgments, by which gentiles and Jews obtain mercy after unbelief; now he recognizes his inadequacy for such an investigation and exclaims his admiration of the divine excellence. First, he extols the divine excellence; second, he proves what he says, at for who has known. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he extols the divine wisdom in itself; second, in relation to us, at how incomprehensible.

He extols the excellence of divine knowledge: first, as to its depth, saying: O the depth: it is a great depth. Who shall find it out? (Eccl 7:25); a glorious throne set on high from the beginning (Jer 17:12). This depth is considered in regard to three things: first, in regard to the thing known, inasmuch as God knows himself perfectly: I dwell in the highest places (Sir 24:7); second, in regard to the manner of knowing, inasmuch as he knows all things through himself: the Lord looked down from his holy height, from heaven the Lord looked at the earth (Ps 102:19); third, in regard to the certainty of his knowledge: the eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the sun (Sir 23:28).

Second, he extols the excellence of divine knowledge in regard to its fullness when he says: of the riches. Abundance of salvation, wisdom, and knowledge (Isa 33:6). This fullness is regarded in three ways: in one way as to the number of things known, because he knows all things: Lord, you know all things (John 21:17); in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col 2:3); in another way in regard to ease of knowing, because he intuits all things without search and difficulty: all things are open and laid bare to his eyes (Heb 4:13). Third, in regard to the abundance of his knowledge, because he gives it generously to everyone: if anyone lacks wisdom, let him ask God who gives to all men generously (Jas 1:5).

Third, he extols the divine excellence in regard to its perfection when he says, of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God. For he has wisdom about divine things: with him is strength and wisdom (Job 12:16), and knowledge about created things: who knows all things knows her (Bar 3:32).

Then when he says, how incomprehensible, he shows the excellence of divine wisdom as compared to our understanding. And first in regard to wisdom, whose function is to judge and put things in order, he says: how incomprehensible are his judgments, because man cannot comprehend the reason of God’s judgments, since they are hidden in his wisdom: your judgments are like the great deep (Ps 36:6); perhaps you will comprehend the steps of God, and will find out the Almighty perfectly? (Job 11:7). Second, in regard to knowledge, through which he is at work in things; hence he adds: and how unsearchable, i.e., not completely searchable by men, his ways, i.e., his procedures, by which he works in creatures. Even though the creatures are known by man, the ways in which God works in them cannot be comprehended by man: your way was through the sea, your paths through the great waters; yet their footprints were unseen (Ps 77:19); where is the way to the dwelling of light (Job 38:19).

Then when he says, for who, he proves what he had said by appealing to two authorities, one of which is in Isaiah: for who has helped the spirit of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? (Isa 40:13). And in place of this he says: for who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor? The other authority is from Job: who has given me before that I should repay him? (Job 41:2). And in place of this he says: or who has first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? In these words and those that follow them the Apostle does three things. First, he shows the excellence of divine wisdom as compared to our understanding, saying: how incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord, namely, through which he judges and acts. As if to say: no one, unless God reveals it: who shall know your thought, except you give wisdom, and send your Holy Spirit from above (Wis 9:17) and the things of God no one knows but the Spirit of God. But to us God has revealed them through his Spirit (1 Cor 2:10).

Second, he shows the excellence of divine wisdom according as it has height in itself, and indeed is that height which is the supreme principle. Two points pertain to this: first, that it does not proceed from something else; second, that other things proceed from it, at for from him. That God’s wisdom does not depend on a higher source is shown in two ways. First, by the fact that it is not instructed by someone else’s teaching. Hence, he says: or who has been his counselor? As if to say: no one. For counsel is needed by one who does not fully know how something is to be done, and this does not apply to God: to whom have you given counsel? Perhaps to him that has no wisdom (Job 26:3). Who has stood in the counsel of the Lord? (Jer 23:18). Second, by the fact that it is not helped by another’s gift. Hence he adds: or who has first given to him, and recompense shall be made him, as one giving first? As if to say: no one. For man can give God only what he has received from God: all this abundance comes from your hand and is all your own (1 Chr 29:16); if you do justly, what shall you give him, or what shall he receive of your hand? (Job 35:7).

Then when he says, for from him, he shows God’s depth, inasmuch as in him are all things. First, he shows his causality; second, his dignity, at to him be glory; third, his perpetuity, at for ever. First, therefore, he says: it is right to say that no one first gave to him, because from him, and through him, and in him, are all things. Thus nothing can be unless received from God. To designate God’s causality he uses three prepositions, namely, from, through, and in. But the preposition from denotes a principle of change; and this is in three ways. In one way the acting or moving principle; in another way the matter; in a third way the opposite contrary, which is the point of departure of the change. For we say that the knife came to be from the knife maker, from the steel, and from the unshaped matter. But the universe of creatures was not made from preexisting matter, because even their matter is an effect of God. Accordingly, created things are not said to be from something but from its opposite, which is nothing; because they were nothing, before they were created to exist: we are born of nothing (Wis 2:2). But all things are from God as from their first maker: all things are from God (1 Cor 11:12).

It should be noted that another Latin word for from is de, which seems to suggest the same relationships; however, de always designates a consubstantial cause. For we say that the knife is from the iron, but not from the maker. Therefore, because the Son proceeds from the Father as consubstantial with him, we say that the Son is from the Father. But creatures do not proceed from God as consubstantial with him; hence, they are not said to be from him but out from him.

The preposition through designates the cause of an action; but because an action lies between the maker and the things he makes, there are two ways in which the preposition through can designate the cause of an action. In one way according as the action comes from its performer, as something which is its own cause of acting is said to act through itself. In one way this is the form, as we say that fire acts through heat. In another way it is a higher agent, as we say that man begets man through the power of the sun or rather of God. So, therefore, all things are said to be through him in two ways: In one way as through the first agent, by whose power all things act: through me kings reign (Prov 8:15). In another way, inasmuch as his wisdom, which is his essence, is the form through which God makes all things: the Lord through wisdom founded the earth (Prov 3:19).

In another way the preposition through designates the cause of an action, not as it comes from the performer but as terminated in its products, as we say that the artisan makes a knife through a hammer: not that the hammer works with the artisan in the way described above, but because the knife comes to be from the activity of the artisan by means of the hammer. Therefore, it is said that this preposition, through, designates authority directly, as when we say that the king acts through his bailiff—which pertains to what is now being said. But sometimes in a causal sense, as when we say that the bailiff acts through the king—which pertains to the preceding mode. In this mode about which we are now speaking, all things are said to have been made by the Father through the Son, as in John: all things were made through him (John 1:3), not that the Father has from the Son the power to make things, but rather that the Son accepts the power of making things from the Father, a power not instrumental but principal, not of a lower order but equal, not diverse but the same: whatever the Father does, that the Son does likewise (John 5:19). Hence, although all things were made by the Father through the Son, the Son is not an instrument or minister of the Father.

The preposition in also designates a causal relationship in three ways: in one way it designates matter, as we say that the soul is in the body or a form in matter. This is not the way in which things are said to be in God, because he is not the material cause of things. In another way it designates a relationship of efficient cause, in whose power it lies to dispose of its effects. In this sense all things are said to be in him, inasmuch as all things lie under his power and arrangement: in his hand are all the ends of the earth (Ps 95:4); in him we live and move and have our being (Acts 17:28). In a third way it designates a relationship of final cause, in that the entire good of a thing and its preservation consists in its own optimum. In this sense all things are said to be in God as in their preserving goodness: all things hold together in him (Col 1:17).

When he says, all things, it is to be taken absolutely for all things which have true being. Sins do not have true being, but insofar as they are sins they lack some being, due to the fact that evil is nothing else than a deprivation of good. Therefore, when he says, from him, and through him, and in him are all things, this does not include sin, because, according to Augustine, sin is nothing and man accomplishes nothing when he sins. Yet, whatever entity is present in sin, it is from God.

Therefore, according to the foregoing, all things are from him, i.e., God as from the first operating power. All things are through him, inasmuch as he makes all things through his wisdom. All things are in him as in their preserving goodness. Now these three things, namely, power, wisdom, and goodness are common to the three persons. Hence, the statement that from him, and through him, and in him can be applied to each of the three persons. Nevertheless, the power, which involves the notion of principle, is appropriated to the Father, who is the principle of the entire Godhead; wisdom to the Son, who proceeds as Word, which is nothing else than wisdom begotten; goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, whose object is goodness. Therefore, by appropriation we can say: from him, namely, from the Father, through him, namely, through the Son, in him, namely, in the Holy Spirit, are all things.

Then when he says, to him be honor and glory for ever, he shows God’s dignity, which consists in the two things previously mentioned. For from the fact that all things are from him and through him and in him, honor and reverence and subjection are owed him by every creature: if I am a father, where is my honor? (Mal 1:6). But from the fact that he has not received either counsel or gifts from anyone, glory is owed him; just as on the contrary it is said of man: if then you received it, why do you boast as though it were not a gift? (1 Cor 4:7). And because this is proper to God, it is said: I am the Lord; my glory I give to no other (Isa 42:8).

Finally, he mentions his eternity when he says: forever, because his glory does not pass as does man’s glory, of which it is said: all his glory is like the flower of the field (Isa 40:6). But God’s glory lasts for all ages, i.e., through all the ages succeeding all ages, inasmuch as the duration of any given thing is called an age. Or for ever refers to the durations of incorruptible things, which contain the ages of corruptible things. This applies especially to God’s eternity, which can be spoken of as a plurality because of the multitude and diversity of things contained in it, even though it is one and simple in itself. The meaning would then be unto the ages that contain the ages: your reign is a reign of all ages (Ps 144:13).

He adds: amen, as confirmation. As if to say: truly it is so. This is the meaning in the gospels when it says: amen, I say to you. Sometimes, however, it means: may it come to pass. Thus in Jerome’s Psalter it says: all the people will say: amen, amen, where our text has may it come to pass! May it come to pass!

Source. Aquinas.cc – Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Chapters 9-11

Commentary on 1 Corinthians, Chapter 2, Lecture 2, Paragraph 93

The second difficulty is that he seems to suppose that the Jewish rulers or the devils did not know that Christ was God. Indeed, as far as the Jewish rulers were concerned, this seems to be supported by Peter’s statement in Acts: I know that you did it in ignorance, as did also your rulers (Acts 3:17).

This in turn seems to be contrary to what it says in Matthew:  but when the tenants saw the son, they said to themselves, this is the heir; come, let us kill him and have his inheritance (Matt 21:38). Furthermore, in explaining this Chrysostom says: by these words the Lord proves clearly that the Jewish rulers killed the Son of God not through ignorance but through envy .

This difficulty is answered in a Gloss, which states that the Jewish rulers knew that he was the one promised in the law, although they did not know his mystery, that he was the Son of God or the sacrament of the Incarnation and redemption .

But this seems to be contradicted by Chrysostom’s own statement that they knew he was the Son of God .

Therefore, the answer is that the Jewish rulers knew for certain that he was the Christ promised in the law, although the people did not know; yet they did not know for certain but somehow conjectured that he was the true Son of God. However, this conjectural knowledge was obscured in them by envy and from a desire for their own glory, which they saw was being diminished by Christ’s excellence.

Source. Aquinas.cc – Commentary on 1 Corinthians, Chapter 2, Lecture 2, Paragraph 93

Commentary on the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, Chapter 2:13-20

1 Thessalonians 2:14-16 – The Jews as Persecutors

Lecture 2, n. 41-48

Then when he says, for you, brethren, he shows how courageously they persevered in the midst of tribulations; and in treating this he makes two points. First, he speaks of their trials, in which they stood firm; second, of the remedy he proposes to apply, at but we, brethren. Again, the first point is divided into two parts. First, Paul commends them for their patience in the face of difficulties; second, he reprehends those responsible for the difficulties, at who both killed.

Consequently, Paul says: you received the word not as the word of men, but as it actually is, the word of God, for you exposed yourselves for its sake even to death. The fact that a man dies for the sake of Christ is testimony to the fact that the words of the faith are the words of God; and, therefore, ‘martyrs’ means the same as ‘witnesses.’ In Judea, for it is there that the faith of Christ was first proclaimed: for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem (Isa 2:3). In addition, it was also there that the first persecution of the faith occurred, as is evident from Acts: on that day a great persecution arose against the church in Jerusalem (Acts 8:1). But recall the former days when, after you were enlightened, you endured a hard struggle with sufferings (Heb 10:32). The Thessalonians endured similar difficulties, so Paul remarks: you also have suffered the same things from your own countrymen, that is, from the incredulous Thessalonians: and a man’s foes will be those of his own household (Matt 10:36).

Then when Paul observes, who both killed the Lord Jesus, he rebukes the Jews who started the persecution. First, he recalls their sin, and then the reason for the sin, at to fill up their sins. In regard to the first point Paul does three things: first, he treats their sin in relation to God’s ministers; second, with reference to God himself; and third as relating to the entire human race. The ministers of God are those who preach, namely, Christ, the prophets and the apostles. Preaching is performed by Christ as the one from whom the doctrine originates, by the prophets who prefigured this doctrine, and by the apostles who carry out the injunction to preach.

Paul first makes reference to Christ when he says: who both killed the Lord Jesus, as is clear from Matthew: this is the heir; come, let us kill him (Matt 21:38). That it was the gentiles who killed him is not a valid objection, for the Jews with their own words asked Pilate to kill him: my heritage has become to me like a lion in the forest, she has lifted up her voice against me (Jer 12:8). Paul then speaks of the prophets when he mentions: and the prophets. Which of the prophets did not your fathers persecute? And they killed those who announced beforehand the coming of the righteous one, whom you have now betrayed and murdered (Acts 7:52). Paul next speaks of the apostles when he comments: and have persecuted us, that is, the apostles. Beware of men, for they will deliver you up to councils (Matt 10:17).

Second, Paul mentions the sin of the Jews in its relation to God, with the words: and do not please God, although they may think that through this they do a service to God, as is evident in John 16:2. Actually, because they do not have zeal for God in accordance with knowledge, they are not pleasing to God, since they do not act in keeping with right faith and without faith it is impossible to please him (Heb 11:6); therefore, the anger of the Lord was kindled against his people (Isa 5:25).

Third, Paul considers their sin in its relation to the whole human race, when he says: and are adversaries to all men. His hand against every man and every man’s hand against him (Gen 16:12). And they are antagonistic, because they prohibit and impede the preaching to the gentiles, and also the conversion of the gentiles. Peter is criticized for having gone to Cornelius (Acts 11:2); also, the elder son, i.e., the Jewish people, is disturbed because the younger son, i.e., the gentile people, is received by the father (Luke 15:28). Woe to him who says to a father: what are you begetting? (Isa 45:10). Would that all the Lord’s people were prophets (Num 11:29).

The reason for this sin is found in the divine permission, by which God wills that they fill up the measure of their sins. Indeed, for all things which come about, either good or bad, there is a certain measure, because nothing is infinite; and the measure of all these things is in God’s foreknowledge. The measure of good things is what it prepares, for grace was given to each of us according to the measure of Christ’s gift (Eph 4:7); the measure of evil things, however, is what it permits, for if some are evil, they are not as evil as they want, but as God permits. And, therefore, they live until they attain that which God permits: fill up, then, the measure of your fathers (Matt 23:32).

So Paul says: to fill up their sins always. For after the suffering of Christ, God gave the Jews forty years to repent, but they were not converted; rather they multiplied their sins. God did not permit this to go on, so Paul states: for the wrath of God is come upon them to the end. For great is the wrath of the Lord that is kindled against us, because our fathers have not obeyed the words of this book, to do according to all that is written concerning us (2 Kgs 22:13). For great distress shall be upon the earth and wrath upon this people (Luke 21:23). And you should not think that this wrath shall last for one hundred years only, but to the end of the world, when all the gentiles will have embraced the Christian religion, and then all of Israel shall be saved (Luke 19:44; 21:6); there will not be left here one stone upon another, that will not be thrown down (Matt 24:2).

Source. Aquinas.cc – Commentary on the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, Chapter 2:13-20

Catena Aurea on the Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 27:15-26

Matthew 27:15-26 – The Jews Choose Barabbas and Condemn Christ

Lecture 4

Chrysostom: Because Christ had answered nothing to the accusations of the Jews, by which Pilate could acquit Him of what was alleged against Him, he contrives other means of saving Him. “Now on the feast day the governor was wont to release unto the people a prisoner whom they would.”

Origen: Thus do the Gentiles show favours to those whom they subject to themselves, until their yoke is riveted. Yet did this practice obtain also among the Jews, Saul did not put Jonathan to death, because all the people sought his life.

Chrysostom: And he sought to rescue Christ by means of this practice, that the Jews might not have the shadow of an excuse left them. A convicted murderer is put in comparison with Christ, Barabbas, whom he calls not merely a robber, but a notable one, that is, renowned for crime.

Jerome: In the Gospel entitled ‘according to the Hebrews,’ Barabbas is interpreted, ‘The son of their master,’ who had been condemned for sedition and murder. Pilate gives them the choice between Jesus and the robber, not doubting but that Jesus would be the rather chosen.

Chrysostom: “Whom will ye that I release unto you?” &c. As much as to say, If ye will not let Him go as innocent, at least, yield Him, as convicted, to this holy day. For if you would have released one of whose guilt there was no doubt, much more should you do so in doubtful cases. Observe how circumstances are reversed. It is the populace who are wont to petition for the condemned, and the prince to grant, but here it is the reverse, the prince asks of the people, and renders them thereby more violent.

Gloss., non occ: The Evangelist adds the reason why Pilate sought to deliver Christ, “For he knew that for envy they had delivered him.”

Remigius: John explains what their envy was, when he says, “Behold, the world is gone after him;” (John 12:19) and, “If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him.” (John 11:48) Observe also that in place of what Matthew says, “Jesus, who is called Christ,” Mark says, “Will ye that I release unto you the King of the Jews?” (Mark 15:9) For the kings of the Jews alone were anointed, and from that anointing were called Christs.

Chrysostom: Then is added something else which alone was enough to deter all from putting Him to death; “When he was set on the judgment seat, his wife sent unto him, saying, Have thou nothing to do with that just man.” For joined with the proof afforded by the events themselves, a dream was no light confirmation.

Rabanus: It is to be noted, that the bench (tribunal) is the seat of the judge, the throne (solium) of the king, the chair (cathedra) of the master. In visions and dreams the wife of a Gentile understood what the Jews when awake would neither believe nor understand.

Jerome: Observe also that visions are often vouchsafed by God to the Gentiles, and that the confession of Pilate and his wife that the Lord was innocent is a testimony of the Gentile people.

Chrysostom: But why did Pilate himself not see this vision? Because his wife was more worthy; or because if Pilate had seen it, he would not have had equal credit, or perhaps would not have told it; wherefore it is provided by God that his wife should see it, and thus it be made manifest to all. And she not merely sees it, but “suffers many things because of him,” so that sympathy with his wife would make the husband more slack to put Him to death. And the time agreed well, for it was the same night that she saw it.

Chrys., Hom. iii, in Caen. Dom: Thus then the judge terrified through his wife, and that he might not consent in the judgment to the accusation of the Jews, himself endured judgment in the affliction of his wife; the judge is judged, and tortured before he tortures.

Rabanus: Or otherwise; The devil now at last understanding that he should lose his trophies through Christ, as he had at the first brought in death by a woman, so by a woman he would deliver Christ out of the hands of His enemies, lest through His death he should lose the sovereignty of death.

Chrysostom: But none of the foregoing things moved Christ’s enemies, because envy had altogether blinded them, and of their own wickedness they corrupt the people, for they “persuaded the people that they should ask Barabbas, and destroy Jesus.”

Origen: Thus it is plainly seen how the Jewish people is moved by its elders and the doctors of the Jewish system, and stirred up against Jesus to destroy Him.

Gloss., non occ: Pilate is said to make this answer, “Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you?” either to the message of his wife, or the petition of the people, with whom it was a custom to ask such release on the feast-day.

Origen: But the populace, like wild beasts that rage the open plains, would have Barabbas released to them. For this people had seditions, murders, robberies, practised by some of their own nation in act, and nourished by all of them who believe not in Jesus, inwardly in their mind. Where Jesus is not, there are strifes and fightings; where He is, there is peace and all good things. All those who are like the Jews either in doctrine or life desire Barabbas to be loosed to them; for whoso does evil, Barabbas is loosed in his body, and Jesus bound; but he that does good has Christ loosed, and Barabbas bound. Pilate sought to strike them with shame for so great injustice, “What shall I do then with Jesus that is called Christ?” And not that only, but desiring to fill up the measure of their guilt. But neither do they blush that Pilate confessed Jesus to be the Christ, nor set any bounds to their impiety, They all say unto him, “Let him be crucified.” Thus they multiplied the sum of their wickedness, not only asking the life of a murderer, but the death of a righteous man, and that the shameful death of the cross.

Rabanus: Those who were crucified being suspended on a cross, by nails driven into the wood through their hands and feet, perished by a lingering death, and lived long on the cross, not that they sought longer life, but that death was deferred to prolong their sufferings. The Jews indeed contrived this as the worst of deaths, but it had been chosen by the Lord without their privity, thereafter to place upon the foreheads of the faithful the same cross as a trophy of His victory over the Devil.

Jerome: Yet even after this answer of theirs, Pilate did not at once assent, but in accordance with his wife’s suggestion, “Have thou nothing to do with that just man,” he answered, “Why, what evil hath he done?” This speech of Pilate’s acquits Jesus. “But they cried out the more, saying, Let him be crucified;” that it might be fulfilled which is said in the Psalm, “Many dogs have compassed me, the congregation of the wicked hath inclosed me;” (Ps 22:16) and also that of Jeremiah, “Mine heritage is unto me as a lion in the forest, they have given forth their voice against me.” (Jer 12:8)

Aug., de Cons. Ev., iii, 8: Pilate many times pleaded with the Jews, desiring that Jesus might be released, which Matthew witnesses in very few words, when he says, “Pilate seeing that he could prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made.” He would not have spoken thus, if Pilate had not striven much, though how many efforts he made to release Jesus he does not mention.

Remigius: It was customary among the ancients, when one would refuse to participate in any crime, to take water and wash his hands before the people.

Jerome: Pilate took water in accordance with that, “I will wash my hands in innocency,” (Ps 26:6) in a manner testifying and saying, I indeed have sought to deliver this innocent man, but since a tumult is rising, and the charge of treason to Caesar is urged against me, I am innocent of the blood of this just man. The judge then who is thus compelled to give sentence against the Lord, does not convict the accused, but the accusers, pronouncing innocent Him who is to be crucified. “See ye to it,” as though he had said, I am the law’s minister, it is your voice that has shed this blood. Then answered all the people and said, “His blood be on us and on our children.” This imprecation rests at the present day upon the Jews, the Lord’s blood is not removed from them.

Chrysostom: Observe here the infatuation of the Jews; their headlong haste, and destructive passions will not let them see what they ought to see, and they curse themselves, saying, “His blood be upon us,” and even entail the curse upon their children. Yet a merciful God did not ratify this sentence, but accepted such of them and of their children as repented; for Paul was of them, and many thousands of those who in Jerusalem believed.

Leo, Serm., 59, 2: The impiety of the Jews then exceeded the fault of Pilate; but he was not guiltless, seeing he resigned his own jurisdiction, and acquiesced in the injustice of others.

Jerome: It should be known that Pilate administered the Roman law, which enacted that every one who was crucified should first be scourged. Jesus then is given up to the soldiers to be beaten, and they tore with whips that most holy body and capacious bosom of God.

Chrys., Hom. iii, in Caena Dom: See the Lord is made ready for the scourge, see now it descends upon Him! That sacred skin is torn by the fury of the rods; the cruel might of repeated blows lacerates His shoulders. Ah me! God is stretched out before man, and He, in whom not one trace of sin can be discerned, suffers punishment as a malefactor.

Jerome: This was done that we might be delivered from those stripes of which it is said, “Many stripes shall be to the wicked.” (Ps 32:10) Also in the washing of Pilate’s hands all the works of the Gentiles are cleansed, and we are acquitted of all share in the impiety of the Jews.

Hilary: At the desire of the Priests the populace chose Barabbas, which is interpreted ‘the son of a Father,’ thus shadowing forth the unbelief to come when Antichrist the son of sin should be preferred to Christ.

Rabanus: Barabbas also, who headed a sedition among the people, is released to the Jews, that is the Devil, who to this day reigns among them, so that they cannot have peace.

Source. Aquinas.cc – Catena Aurea on the Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 27:15-26

Catena Aurea on the Gospel of John, Chapter 8:37-47

John 8:37-47 – The Jews as Children of the Devil, Not of Abraham

Lecture 9-11

Augustine: The Jews had asserted they were free, because they were Abraham’s seed. Our Lord replies, I know that you are Abraham’s seed; as if to say, I know that you are the sons of Abraham, but according to the flesh, not spiritually and by faith. So He adds, But you seek to kill Me.

Chrysostom: He says this, that they might not attempt to answer, that they had no sin. He reminds them of a present sin; a sin which they had been meditating for some time past, and which was actually at this moment in their thoughts: putting out of the question their general course of life. He thus removes them by degrees out of their relationship to Abraham, teaching them not to pride themselves so much upon it: for that, as bondage and freedom were the consequences of works, so was relationship. And that they might not say, We do so justly, He adds the reason why they did so; Because My word has no place in you.

Augustine: That is, has not place in your hearts, because your heart does not take it in. The word of God to the believing, is like the hook to the fish; it takes when it is taken: and that not to the injury of those who are caught by it. They are caught for their salvation, not for their destruction.

Chrysostom: He does not say, you do not take in My word, but My word has not room in you; showing the depth of His doctrines. But they might say; What if you speak of yourself? So He adds, I speak that which I have seen of My Father; for I have not only the Father’s substance, but His truth.

Augustine: Our Lord by His Father wishes us to understand God: as if to say, I have seen the truth, I speak the truth, because I am the truth. If our Lord then speaks the truth which He saw with the Father, it is Himself that He saw, Himself that He speaks; He being Himself the truth of the Father.

Origen: This is proof that our Savior was witness to what was done with the Father: whereas men, to whom the revelation is made, were not witnesses.

Theophylact: But when you hear, I speak that which I have seen, do not think it means bodily vision, but innate knowledge, sure, and approved. For as the eyes when they see an object, see it wholly and correctly; so I speak with certainty what I know from My Father. And, you do that which you have seen with your father.

Origen: As yet He has not named their father; He mentioned Abraham indeed a little above, but now He is going to mention another father, viz. the devil: whose sons they were, in so far as they were wicked, not as being men. Our Lord is reproaching them for their evil deeds.

Chrysostom: Another reading has, And do you do that which you have seen with your father; as if to say, As I both in word and deed declare to you the Father, so do you by your works show forth Abraham.

Origen: Also another reading has; And, do you do what you have heard from the Father. All that was written in the Law and the Prophets they had heard from the Father. He who takes this reading, may use it to prove against them who hold otherwise, that the God who gave the Law and the Prophets, was none other than Christ’s Father. And we use it too as an answer to those who maintain two original natures in men, and explain the words, My word has no place in you, to mean that these were by nature incapable of receiving the word. How could those be of an incapable nature, who had heard from the Father? And how again could they be of a blessed nature, who sought to kill our Savior, and would not receive His words. They answered and said to Him, Abraham is our father. This answer of the Jews is a great falling off from our Lord’s meaning. He had referred to God, but they take Father in the sense of the father of their nature, Abraham.

Augustine: As if to say, What are you going to say against Abraham? They seem to be inviting Him to say something in disparagement of Abraham; and so to give them an opportunity of executing their purpose.

Origen: Our Savior denies that Abraham is their father: Jesus said to them, If you were Abraham’s children, you would do the works of Abraham.

Augustine: And yet He says above, I know that you are Abraham’s seed. So He does not deny their origin, but condemns their deeds. Their flesh was from him; their life was not.

Origen: Or we may explain the difficulty thus. Above it is in the Greek, I know that you are Abraham’s seed. So let us examine whether there is not a difference between a bodily seed and a child. It is evident that a seed contains in itself all the proportions of him whose seed it is, as yet however dormant, and waiting to be developed; when the seed first has changed and molded the material it meets within the woman, derived nourishment from thence and gone through a process in the womb, it becomes a child, the likeness of its begetter. So then a child is formed from the seed: but the seed is not necessarily a child. Now with reference to those who are from their works judged to be the seed of Abraham, may we not conceive that they are so from certain seminal proportions implanted in their souls? All men are not the seed of Abraham, for all have not these proportions implanted in their souls. But he who is the seed of Abraham, has yet to become his child by likeness. And it is possible for him by negligence and indolence even to cease to be the seed. But those to whom these words were addressed, were not yet cut off from hope: and therefore Jesus acknowledged that they were as yet the seed of Abraham, and had still the power of becoming children of Abraham. So He says, If you are the children of Abraham, do the works of Abraham. If as the seed of Abraham, they had attained to their proper sign and growth, they would have taken in our Lord’s words. But not having grown to be children, they cared not; but wish to kill the Word, and as it were break it in pieces, since it was too great for them to take in. If any of you then be the seed of Abraham, and as yet do not take in the word of God, let him not seek to kill the word; but rather change himself into being a son of Abraham, and then he will be able to take in the Son of God. Some select one of the works of Abraham, viz. that in Genesis, And Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness. But even granting to them that faith is a work, if this were so, why was it not, Do the work of Abraham: using the singular number, instead of the plural? The expression as it stands is, I think, equivalent to saying, Do all the works of Abraham: i.e. in the spiritual sense, interpreting Abraham’s history allegorically. For it is not incumbent on one, who would be a son of Abraham, to marry his maidservants, or after his wife’s death, to marry another in his old age. But now you seek to kill Me, a man that has told you the truth.

Chrysostom: This truth, that is, that He was equal to the Father: for it was this that moved the Jews to kill Him. To show, however, that this doctrine is not opposed to the Father, He adds, Which I have heard from God.

Alcuin: Because He Himself, Who is the truth, was begotten of God the Father, to hear, being in fact the same with to be from the Father.

Origen: To kill Me, He says, a man. I say nothing now of the Son of God, nothing of the Word, because the Word cannot die; I speak only of that which you see. It is in your power to kill that which you see, and offend Him Whom you see not. This did not Abraham.

Alcuin: As if to say, By this you prove that you are not the sons of Abraham; that you do works contrary to those of Abraham.

Origen: But it might seem to some, that it were superfluous to say that Abraham did not this; for it were impossible that it should be; Christ was not born at that time. But we may remind them, that in Abraham’s time there was a man born who spoke the truth, which he heard from God, and that this man’s life was not sought for by Abraham. Know too that the Saints were never without the spiritual advent of Christ. I understand then from this passage, that every one who, after regeneration, and other divine graces bestowed upon him, commits sin, does by this return to evil incur the guilt of crucifying the Son of God, which Abraham did not do. You do the works of your father.

Augustine: He does not say as yet who is their father.

Chrysostom: Our Lord says this with a view to put down their vain boasting of their descent; and persuade them to rest their hopes of salvation no longer on the natural relationship, but on the adoption. For this it was which prevented them from coming to Christ; viz. their thinking that their relationship to Abraham was sufficient for their salvation.

Augustine: The Jews had begun to understand that our Lord was not speaking of sonship according to the flesh, but of manner of life. Scripture often speaks of spiritual fornication, with many gods, and of the soul being prostituted, as it were, by paying worship to false gods. This explains what follows: Then said they to Him, We be not born of fornication; we have one Father, even God.

Theophylact: As if their motive against Him was a desire to avenge God’s honor.

Origen: Or their sonship to Abraham having been disproved, they reply by bitterly insinuating, that our Savior was the offspring of adultery. But perhaps the tone of the answer is disputatious, more than any thing else. For whereas they have said shortly before, We have Abraham for our father, and had been told in reply, If you are Abraham’s children, do the works of Abraham; they declare in return that they have a greater Father than Abraham, i.e. God; and that they were not derived from fornication. For the devil, who has no power of creating any thing from himself, begets not from a spouse, but a harlot, i.e. matter, those who give themselves up to carnal things, that is, cleave to matter.

Chrysostom: But what say you? Have you God for your Father, and do you blame Christ for speaking thus? Yet true it was, that many of them were born of fornication, for people then used to form unlawful connections. But this is not the thing our Lord has in view. He is bent on proving that they are not from God. Jesus said to them, If God were your Father, you would love Me: for I proceeded forth and came from God.

Hilary: It was not that the Son of God condemned the assumption of so religious a name; that is, condemned them for professing to be the sons of God, and calling God the Father; but that He blamed the rash presumption of the Jews in claiming God for their Father, when they did not love the Son. For I proceeded forth, and came from God. To proceed forth is not the same with to come. When our Lord says that those who called God their Father, ought to love Him, because He came forth from God, He means that His being born of God was the reason why He should be loved: the proceeding forth, having reference to His incorporeal birth. Their claim to be the sons of God, was to be made good by their loving Christ, Who was begotten from God. For a true worshiper of God the Father must love the Son, as being from God. And he only can love the Father, who believes that the Son is from Him.

Augustine: This then is the eternal procession, the proceeding forth of the Word from God: from Him. It proceeded as the Word of the Father, and came to us: The Word was made flesh. His advent is His humanity: His staying, His divinity. You call God your Father; acknowledge Me at least to be a brother.

Hilary: In what follows, He teaches that His origin is not in Himself; Neither came I of Myself, but He sent Me.

Origen: This was said, I think, in allusion to some who came without being sent by the Father, of whom it is said in Jeremiah, I have not sent these prophets, yet they ran. Some, however, use this passage to prove the existence of two natures. To these we may reply, Paul hated Jesus when he persecuted the Church of God, at the time, viz. that our Lord said, Why persecute you Me? Now if it is true, as is here said, If God were your Father, you would love Me; the converse is true, If you do not love Me, God is not your Father. And Paul for some time did not love Jesus. There was a time when God was not Paul’s father. Paul therefore was not by nature the son of God, but afterwards was made so. And when does God become any one’s Father, except when he keeps His commandments?

Chrysostom: And because they were ever inquiring, What is this which He said, Whither I go you cannot come? He adds here, Why do you not understand My speech? even because you cannot hear My word.

Augustine: And they could not hear, because they would not believe, and amend their lives.

Origen: First then, that virtue must be sought after, which hears the divine word; that by degrees we may be strong enough to embrace the whole teaching of Jesus. For so long as a man has not his hearing restored by the Word, which says to the deaf ear, Be opened: so long he cannot hear.

Chrysostom: Our Lord, having already cut off the Jews from relationship to Abraham, overthrows now this far greater claim, to call God their Father, You are of your father the devil.

Augustine: Here we must guard against the heresy of the Manicheans, who hold a certain original nature of evil, and a nation of darkness with princes at their head, whence the devil derives his existence. And thence they say our flesh is produced; and in this way interpret our Lord’s speech, You are of your father the devil: viz. to mean that they were by nature evil, drawing their origin from the opposite seed of darkness.

Origen: And this seems to be the same mistake, as if one said, that an eye which saw right was different in kind from an eye which saw wrong. For just as in these there is no difference of kind, only one of them for some reason sees wrong; so, in the other case, whether a man receives a doctrine, or whether he does not, he is of the same nature.

Augustine: The Jews then were children of the devil by imitation, not by birth: And the lusts of your father you will do, our Lord says. You are his children then, because you have such lusts, not because you are born of him: for you seek to kill Me, a man that has told you the truth: and he envied man, and killed him: he was a murderer from the beginning; i.e. of the first man on whom a murder could be committed: man could not he slain, before man was created. The devil did not go, girt with a sword, against man: he sowed an evil word, and slew him. Do not suppose therefore that you are not guilty of murder, when you suggest evil thoughts to your brother. The very reason why you rage against the flesh, is that you cannot assault the soul.

Origen: Consider too, it was not one man only that he killed, but the whole human race, inasmuch as in Adam all die; so that he is truly called a murderer from the beginning.

Chrysostom: He does not say, his works, but his lusts you will do, meaning that both the devil and the Jews were bent on murder, to satisfy their envy. And stood not in the truth. He shows whence sprang their continual objection to Him, that He was not from God.

Augustine: But it will be objected perhaps, that if from the beginning of his existence, the devil stood not in the truth, he was never in a state of blessedness with the holy angels, refusing, as he did, to be subject to his Creator, and therefore false and deceitful; unwilling at the cost of pious subjection to hold that which by nature he was; and attempting in his pride and loftiness to simulate that which he was not. This opinion is not the same with that of the Manichaeans, that the devil has his own peculiar nature, derived as it were from the opposite principle of evil. This foolish sect does not see that our Lord says not, Was alien from the truth, but Stood not in the truth, meaning, fell from the truth. And thus they interpret John, The devil sins from the beginning, not seeing that if sin is natural, it is no sin. But what do the testimonies of the prophets reply? Isaiah, setting forth the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon, says, How are you fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! Ezekiel says, You have been in Eden, the garden of God. Which passages, as they cannot be interpreted in any other way, show that we must take the word, He stood not in the truth, to mean, that he was in truth, but did not remain in it; and the other, that the devil sins from the beginning, to mean, that he was a sinner not from the beginning of his creation, but from the beginning of sin. For sin began in him, and he was the beginning of sin.

Origen: There is only one way of standing in the truth; many and various of not standing in it. Some try to stand in the truth, but their feet tremble and shake so, they cannot. Others are not come to that pass, but are in danger of it, as we read in the Psalms, My feet were almost gone: others fall from it. Because the truth is not in him, is the reason why the devil did not stand in the truth. He imagined vain things, and deceived himself; wherein He was so far worse than others, in that, while others are deceived by him, he was the author of his own deception. But farther; does the truth is not in him, mean that he holds no true doctrine, and that every thing he thinks is false; or that he is not a member of Christ, who says, I am the truth? Now it is impossible that any rational being should think falsely on every subject and never be even ever so slightly right in opinion. The devil therefore may hold a true doctrine, by the mere law of his rational nature: and therefore his nature is not contrary to truth, i.e. does not consist of simple error and ignorance; otherwise he could never have known the truth.

Augustine: Or when our Lord says, The truth is not in him, He intends it as an index: as if we had asked Him, how it appeared that the devil stood not in the truth; and He said, Because the truth is not in him. For it would be in him, if he stood in it. When he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.

Augustine: Some have thought from these words that the devil had a father, and asked who was the father of the devil This is the error of the Manichaeans. But our Lord calls the devil the father of a lie for this reason: Every one who lies is not the father of his own lie; for you may tell a lie, which you have received from another; in which ease you have lied, but are not the father of the lie. But the lie wherewith, as with a serpent’s bite, the devil slew man, had no source but himself: and therefore he is the father of a lie, as God is the Father of the truth.

Theophylact: For he accused God to man, saying to Eve, But of envy He has forbidden you the tree: and to God he accused man, as in Job, Does Job serve God, for wrought?

Origen: Note however this word, liar, is applied to man, as well as to the devil, who begat a lie, as we read in the Psalm, All men are liars. If a man is not a liar, he is not an ordinary man, but one of those, to whom it is said, I have said, you are Gods. When a man speaks a lie, he speaks of his own; but the Holy Spirit speaks the word of truth and wisdom; as he said below, He shall receive of Mine, and shall show it to you.

Augustine: Or thus: The devil is not a singular, but a common name. In whomsoever the works of the devil are found, he is to be called the devil. It is the name of a work, not of a nature. Here then our Lord means by the father of the Jews, Cain; whom they wished to imitate, by killing the Savior: for he it was who set the first example of murdering a brother. That he spoke a lie of his own, means that no one sins but by his own will. And inasmuch as Cain imitated the devil, and followed his works, the devil is said to be his father.

Alcuin: Our Lord being the truth, and the Son of the true God, spoke the truth; but the Jews, being the sons of the devil, were averse to the truth; and this is why our Lord says, Because I tell you the truth, you believe not.

Origen: But how is this said to the Jews, who believed in Him? Consider: a man may believe in one sense, not believe in another; e.g. that our Lord was crucified by Pontius Pilate, but not that He was born of the Virgin Mary. In this same way, those whom He is speaking to, believed in Him as a worker of miracles, which they saw Him to be; but did not believe in His doctrines, which were too deep for them.

Chrysostom: You wish to kill Me then, because you are enemies of the truth, not that you have any fault to find in Me: for, which of you convinces Me of sin?

Theophylact: As if to say: If you are the sons of God, you ought to hold sinners in hatred. If you hate Me, when you cannot convince Me of sin, it is evident that you hate Me because of the truth: i.e. because I said I was the Son of God.

Origen: A bold speech this; which none could have had the confidence to utter, but he Who did no sin; even our Lord.

Gregory: Observe here the condescension of God. He who in by virtue of His Divinity could justify sinners, deigns to show from reason, that He is not a sinner. It follows: He that is of God hears God’s words; you therefore hear them not, because you are not of God.

Augustine: Apply this not to their nature, but to their faults. They both are from God and are not from God at the same time; their nature is from God, their fault is not from God. This was spoken too to those, who were not only faulty, by reason of sin, in the way in which all are: but who it was foreknown would never possess such faith as would free them from the bonds of sin.

Gregory: Let him then, who would understand God’s words ask himself whether he hears them with the ears of his heart. For there are some who do not deign to hear God’s commands even with their bodily ears; and there are others who do this, but do not embrace them with their heart’s desire; and there are others again who receive God’s words readily, yes and are touched, even to tears: but who afterwards go back to their sins again; and therefore cannot be said to hear the word of God, because they neglect to practice it.

Source. Aquinas.cc – Catena Aurea on the Gospel of John, Chapter 8:37-47